Open Advanced Search

Log in
Enterprise Plans
Sign Up

Log in
Sign Up
Enterprise Plans
Browse
Features
Pricing

DeepDyve

Advanced Search

show/hide query preview

With all of the words or DOIs:

DeepDyve's default query mode: search by keyword or DOI.

With the exact phrase:

Require these words, in this exact order. Do not surround your terms in double-quotes ("") in this field.

With at least one of the words:

Find any of these words, separated by spaces

Without the words:

Exclude each of these words, separated by spaces

With words in the article title:

Search for these terms only in the title of an article

Published between the years:

With the following authors:

Most effective as: LastName, First Name or Lastname, FN

With words in the journal name:

Search for articles published in journals where these words are in the journal name

Reset filters

Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

DeepDyve requires Javascript to function. Please enable Javascript on your browser to continue.

Rethinking Knowledge

Part of the European Studies in Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 4)

DOI: 10.1007/978-3-319-53237-0

ISBN: 978-3-319-53236-3

Publisher: Springer International Publishing - Springer Journals

Mar 30, 2017

1 - 10 of 26 Chapters

LitStream

Chapter 1Introduction

Cellucci, Carlo

Pages: 1 –8

[By invading many areas traditionally covered by philosophy, modern science has made philosophy increasingly irrelevant, and has presented it with the challenge to legitimate itself. This challenge has not been successfully met, so much so that several scientists, and even some philosophers, have...
LitStream

The Heuristic View

Cellucci, Carlo

Pages: 11 –29

[As a response to the increasing irrelevance of philosophy, this chapter lists the characteristics philosophy should have in order to be fruitful. This results in a view of philosophy that may be called the heuristic view, according to which philosophy aims at knowledge and methods to acquire...
LitStream

The Foundationalist View

Cellucci, Carlo

Pages: 31 –39

[The heuristic view of philosophy is opposed to the foundationalist view, according to which philosophy does not aim at knowledge and methods to acquire knowledge, but only at justifying already obtained knowledge, by providing a foundation for it. The foundationalist view assumes, first, that...
LitStream

The Limits of Scepticism

Cellucci, Carlo

Pages: 41 –52

[The main motivation of the foundationalist view is to save knowledge from sceptical doubt. This chapter maintains that such motivation is unjustified. Indeed, according to a widespread opinion, absolute scepticism is irrefutable, since no logical argument can be advanced against it. On the...
LitStream

Philosophy and the Humanistic Disciplines

Cellucci, Carlo

Pages: 53 –62

[According to the heuristic view, philosophy is not essentially different from the sciences. Some people oppose this view, claiming that philosophy is a humanistic discipline which aims to make sense of ourselves and of our activities, contrary to the sciences, which have nothing to say about...
LitStream

Knowledge and Naturalism

Cellucci, Carlo

Pages: 65 –81

[In the past century, the prevailing view has been that the main problem of epistemology, or theory of knowledge, is to give a definition of knowledge, and the prevailing definition of knowledge has been that knowledge is justified true belief. This contrasts with the fact that, since antiquity,...
LitStream

Knowledge and Reality

Cellucci, Carlo

Pages: 83 –92

[One of the main questions about knowledge is the relation of knowledge to reality. This question is particularly important for the heuristic view of philosophy, according to which philosophy aims at knowledge and methods to acquire knowledge. In the course of the history of philosophy, the...
LitStream

Knowledge and Truth

Cellucci, Carlo

Pages: 93 –106

[Since antiquity, several philosophers and scientists have claimed that the aim of science is truth. This raises the question: What is truth? A popular answer is that a proposition is true if it corresponds to the facts to which it refers. This is the concept of truth as correspondence. However,...
LitStream

Knowledge, Plausibility, and Common Sense

Cellucci, Carlo

Pages: 107 –118

[As an alternative to the view that the aim of science is truth, this chapter maintains that the aim of science is plausibility, and specifically to make plausible hypotheses about the world, namely hypotheses such that the arguments for them are stronger than those against them, on the basis of...
LitStream

Other Questions About Knowledge

Cellucci, Carlo

Pages: 119 –130

[This chapter considers the relations of knowledge to objectivity, certainty, intuition, deduction, and rigour. It argues that knowledge cannot be objective in the sense of being totally independent of any subject, but only in the sense of being as independent as possible of any particular human...

results per page

Browse All eBooks

Features

Search and discover articles on DeepDyve, PubMed, and Google Scholar
Read the full-text of open access and premium content
Organize articles with folders and bookmarks
Collaborate on and share articles and folders

Info

Pricing
Enterprise Plans
Browse Journals & Topics
About DeepDyve

Help

Help
Publishers
Contact Us

Sign up for your DeepDyve account now!

Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.

System error. Please try again!

Continue with Facebook

By signing up, you agree to DeepDyve’s Terms of Service and Privacy Policy.

Already have an account? Log in

Save Article to Bookmarks

Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.

To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.

Subscribe to Journal Email Alerts

To subscribe to email alerts, please log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.

Follow a Journal

To get new article updates from a journal on your personalized homepage, please log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.

Our policy towards the use of cookies

All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.

cookie policy