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Believable Normative Error Theory

Believable Normative Error Theory Abstract Normative error theory is thought by some to be unbelievable because they suppose the incompatibility of believing a proposition at the same time as believing that one has no normative reason to believe it—which believing in normative error theory would seem to involve. In this article, I argue that normative holism is believable and that a normative holist will believe that the truth of a proposition does not invariably generate a normative reason to believe it. I outline five different scenarios in which this is believably the case. I then show how each example can be used to generate a counterexample to the incompatibility claim. I conclude that believing a proposition is compatible with believing there is no reason to believe it and that as such normative error theory has not yet been shown to be unbelievable. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of the American Philosophical Association Cambridge University Press

Believable Normative Error Theory

sIntroductionsNormative reasons are reasons to do and believe things. Normative error theory is the view that no normative reasons exist. Bart Streumer has made a now well-known argument for the unbelievability of normative error theory. Streumer argues that believing a proposition is incompatible with at the same time believing that there is positively no normative reason to believe it. As believing in normative error theory would involve believing that there is positively no normative reason to believe it, Streumer concludes that normative error theory is unbelievable. In this article, I challenge Streumer's case. I argue that it is possible to believe a proposition and at the same time believe that there is no reason to believe it. Normative error theory may still be unbelievable, but Streumer has not provided us with compelling grounds for thinking it so.sTo make my case I first argue that holism about normative reasons is perfectly believable and that a holist about normative reasons should accept that, in principle anyway, the truth of a proposition does not invariably give rise to there being a normative reason to believe it. I then describe various examples in which this seems to be the case. Then I show how each example can be used to generate a counterexample to the claim that believing a proposition is incompatible with at the same time believing there is positively no reason to believe it. Finally, I consider a range of objections and explain why none of them ought to be found persuasive.sThe Unbelievability ArgumentsAlthough there are different ways in which one might arrive at the conclusion that normative error theory is unbelievable, Streumer focuses on the fact that believing normative error theory would seem to involve believing, at the same time, that there is positively no reason to believe it.sTo elaborate: Streumer uses the term belief to mean explicit and occurrent beliefs that satisfy the following two conditions:s(B1) A person...
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References (21)

Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of the American Philosophical Association
ISSN
2053-4485
eISSN
2053-4477
DOI
10.1017/apa.2021.14
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract Normative error theory is thought by some to be unbelievable because they suppose the incompatibility of believing a proposition at the same time as believing that one has no normative reason to believe it—which believing in normative error theory would seem to involve. In this article, I argue that normative holism is believable and that a normative holist will believe that the truth of a proposition does not invariably generate a normative reason to believe it. I outline five different scenarios in which this is believably the case. I then show how each example can be used to generate a counterexample to the incompatibility claim. I conclude that believing a proposition is compatible with believing there is no reason to believe it and that as such normative error theory has not yet been shown to be unbelievable.

Journal

Journal of the American Philosophical AssociationCambridge University Press

Published: Jun 1, 2022

Keywords: normative error theory; metaethics; ethics; normative reasons; normativity

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