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Should we pass the buck?

Should we pass the buck? My topic is the relation between the right and the good. I introduce it by relating some aspects of the debate between various British intuitionists in the first half of the present century.In Principia Ethica (1903) G. E. Moore claimed that to be right is to be productive of the greatest good. He wrote ‘This use of “right”, as denoting what is good as a means, whether or not it be also good as an end, is indeed the use to which I shall confine the word’ (p. 18). By the time he wrote his Ethics (1912, e.g. p. 6) he seems to have weakened his position, and offers conduciveness to the good not as a definition of ‘right’ but as an account of the one and only property that makes acts right. Even if it be the only right-making property, conduciveness to the good will not be identical with the right-ness that it makes. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement Cambridge University Press

Should we pass the buck?

Royal Institute of Philosophy Supplement , Volume 47: 15 – Jan 8, 2010

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References (6)

Publisher
Cambridge University Press
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy and the contributors 2000
ISSN
1755-3555
eISSN
1358-2461
DOI
10.1017/S1358246100006974
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

My topic is the relation between the right and the good. I introduce it by relating some aspects of the debate between various British intuitionists in the first half of the present century.In Principia Ethica (1903) G. E. Moore claimed that to be right is to be productive of the greatest good. He wrote ‘This use of “right”, as denoting what is good as a means, whether or not it be also good as an end, is indeed the use to which I shall confine the word’ (p. 18). By the time he wrote his Ethics (1912, e.g. p. 6) he seems to have weakened his position, and offers conduciveness to the good not as a definition of ‘right’ but as an account of the one and only property that makes acts right. Even if it be the only right-making property, conduciveness to the good will not be identical with the right-ness that it makes.

Journal

Royal Institute of Philosophy SupplementCambridge University Press

Published: Jan 8, 2010

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