Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Subscribe now for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This chapter argues that it is both reasonable and worthwhile for the non-dialetheist to engage in dispute with the dialetheist. From principles acceptable to dialetheists, it can be shown that affirming true contradictions involves the violation of meaning constraints; here, appeal is made to the relationship between Quinean matrices of belief and disbelief, and the voluntary practices of accepting and rejection. It is further argued that dialetheism involves an ad hoc asymmetry between the roles of truth and falsity, that it is unable to give an adequate account of the ‘classical recapture’ of the classical mathematics we need for science, and that it cannot provide a non-subjective characterization of the distinction between good and bad contradictions, this implicating it in a form of irrationalism.</jats:p> http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Law of Non-Contradiction CrossRef

CrossRef — Oct 21, 2004


Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title>
<jats:p>This chapter argues that it is both reasonable and worthwhile for the non-dialetheist to engage in dispute with the dialetheist. From principles acceptable to dialetheists, it can be shown that affirming true contradictions involves the violation of meaning constraints; here, appeal is made to the relationship between Quinean matrices of belief and disbelief, and the voluntary practices of accepting and rejection. It is further argued that dialetheism involves an ad hoc asymmetry between the roles of truth and falsity, that it is unable to give an adequate account of the ‘classical recapture’ of the classical mathematics we need for science, and that it cannot provide a non-subjective characterization of the distinction between good and bad contradictions, this implicating it in a form of irrationalism.</jats:p>

Loading next page...
/lp/crossref/c0xT3BGZHw

References

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher site
See Book on Publisher Site

Abstract

<jats:title>Abstract</jats:title> <jats:p>This chapter argues that it is both reasonable and worthwhile for the non-dialetheist to engage in dispute with the dialetheist. From principles acceptable to dialetheists, it can be shown that affirming true contradictions involves the violation of meaning constraints; here, appeal is made to the relationship between Quinean matrices of belief and disbelief, and the voluntary practices of accepting and rejection. It is further argued that dialetheism involves an ad hoc asymmetry between the roles of truth and falsity, that it is unable to give an adequate account of the ‘classical recapture’ of the classical mathematics we need for science, and that it cannot provide a non-subjective characterization of the distinction between good and bad contradictions, this implicating it in a form of irrationalism.</jats:p>

Published: Oct 21, 2004

There are no references for this article.