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From business to war

From business to war Abstract From business to war: Although illicit markets are generally peaceful, at times they burst into massive transitional violence. One example for such an upsurge in violence is Mexico where the drug cartels are engaged in a bloody war. The Mexican case reveals that two interrelated factors can incite transitional illegal violence. First, market changes that close or open up business opportunities can lead to violent criminal competition. Second, political changes can cause or increase criminal violence. When collusive state-crime relations erode and the state increases law enforcement against criminal groups, they are likely to fight back. Both factors are tightly connected: criminal competition may erode protection rackets and incite harsher law enforcement. Law enforcement in turn may lead to the fragmentation of crime groups and cause more violent competition. Massive criminal violence is fed by further factors such as the easy availability of both weapons and specialists in violence and the displacement effect of intensive law enforcement in regions characterized by weak state structures. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Behemoth de Gruyter

From business to war

Behemoth , Volume 6 (1) – Jun 1, 2013

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Publisher
de Gruyter
Copyright
Copyright © 2013 by the
ISSN
2191-7582
eISSN
1866-2447
DOI
10.1515/behemoth-2013-0005
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract From business to war: Although illicit markets are generally peaceful, at times they burst into massive transitional violence. One example for such an upsurge in violence is Mexico where the drug cartels are engaged in a bloody war. The Mexican case reveals that two interrelated factors can incite transitional illegal violence. First, market changes that close or open up business opportunities can lead to violent criminal competition. Second, political changes can cause or increase criminal violence. When collusive state-crime relations erode and the state increases law enforcement against criminal groups, they are likely to fight back. Both factors are tightly connected: criminal competition may erode protection rackets and incite harsher law enforcement. Law enforcement in turn may lead to the fragmentation of crime groups and cause more violent competition. Massive criminal violence is fed by further factors such as the easy availability of both weapons and specialists in violence and the displacement effect of intensive law enforcement in regions characterized by weak state structures.

Journal

Behemothde Gruyter

Published: Jun 1, 2013

There are no references for this article.