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References (73)
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“ Human beings are citizens, not merely consumers, and their consumption choices, as measured by [willingness to pay], might be trumped by their re fl ective judgments as citizens. ”
- Publisher
- MIT Press
- Copyright
- © 2023 Gabriel L. Levine. Published under a Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license (CC BY-NC-ND).
- eISSN
- 2694-5711
- DOI
- 10.1162/ajle_a_00059
- Publisher site
- See Article on Publisher Site
Abstract
AMERICAN JOURNAL of LAW and EQUALITY Gabriel L. Levine* Regulatory review’s primary tool is economic: cost–benefit analysis. But regulation’s conse- quences are not just economic; they are also political. In this article, I offer a new approach to regulatory review, one with politics at its core. I show why politics matters for regulation and how policy makers can rigorously assess their decisions’ political implications over time. If regulators should think about politics, what values should guide them? To answer this question, I focus on an especially important subset of policy challenges, which I call “structural risks.” These are systemic problems that worsen over time, such as climate change. Structural risks bring into stark relief the importance of politics for regulatory review: they affect the political capacities of future generations, are exceptionally complex, and require durable political coalitions to be managed. I argue that there are strong reasons, both principled and pragmatic, to regulate these risks democratically—that is, in ways that respect and reinforce citizens’ freedom and equality. Structural-risk regulation requires defining goals across ecological, economic, and other large-scale systems. Administrators’ mandate to choose these goals demands democratic legitimation. And their policies will be less effective without the social trust
Journal
American Journal of Law and Equality – MIT Press
Published: Sep 15, 2023