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A critical reflection on the ‘Public Interest Exemption’ in China’s merger control regime

A critical reflection on the ‘Public Interest Exemption’ in China’s merger control regime The Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) in China allows the responsible authority for merger control to consider not only the competition interest but also other public interest reasons when it reviews a takeover or merger. Where the responsible authority considers that the benefits of a takeover or merger to the public interest outweigh the harms to competition, it may ‘exempt’ the transaction. This ‘public interest exemption’ has never been formally applied since the introduction of the law in 2008. One explanation for this can be found in the ambiguity of the law: there are no legal provisions that clarify the public interest considerations. A second explanation is that China did not establish a separate review procedure for this public interest exemption. In practice, some approval decisions made by the enforcement authority led to confusion, as it was unclear whether the transactions were ‘exempted’ for public interest reasons or for industrial policies. This article reflects on the role of the public interest exemption in China. By drawing lessons from the past and examining the public interest exemption regime in Germany, it aims to provide suggestions for future reforms, against the background of the promulgation of the Amendment to the AML in 2022. http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Journal of Antitrust Enforcement Oxford University Press

A critical reflection on the ‘Public Interest Exemption’ in China’s merger control regime

Ai, Huizi; Philipsen, Niels J
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement , Volume 11 (3): 18 – Jan 4, 2023
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Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2023. Published by Oxford University Press. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
ISSN
2050-0688
eISSN
2050-0696
DOI
10.1093/jaenfo/jnac030
Publisher site
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Abstract

The Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) in China allows the responsible authority for merger control to consider not only the competition interest but also other public interest reasons when it reviews a takeover or merger. Where the responsible authority considers that the benefits of a takeover or merger to the public interest outweigh the harms to competition, it may ‘exempt’ the transaction. This ‘public interest exemption’ has never been formally applied since the introduction of the law in 2008. One explanation for this can be found in the ambiguity of the law: there are no legal provisions that clarify the public interest considerations. A second explanation is that China did not establish a separate review procedure for this public interest exemption. In practice, some approval decisions made by the enforcement authority led to confusion, as it was unclear whether the transactions were ‘exempted’ for public interest reasons or for industrial policies. This article reflects on the role of the public interest exemption in China. By drawing lessons from the past and examining the public interest exemption regime in Germany, it aims to provide suggestions for future reforms, against the background of the promulgation of the Amendment to the AML in 2022.

Journal

Journal of Antitrust Enforcement – Oxford University Press

Published: Jan 4, 2023

Keywords: Merger control; Competition interest; Public interest; National security; China; Germany; K21

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