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A Simple Theory of Aesthetic Value

A Simple Theory of Aesthetic Value This article aims to answer the aesthetic-value question: (AVQ) What makes aesthetic value aesthetic value? If we have yet to answer it adequately, perhaps that is because we have yet to understand what we are asking for when we ask it. The first of this paper’s three ambitions, accordingly, is to catalog a series of assumptions we make when asking the AVQ. The second is to cast doubt on those assumptions. The third is to outline an answer that does not depend on them. Here, then, are the assumptions: The AVQ is compound, reducing to two simple questions: (AQ) What makes aesthetic value aesthetic? (VQ) What makes aesthetic value value? 2. The VQ is a request for the genus of aesthetic value. 3. An adequate answer to the VQ must meet the rational constraint; that is, it must identify the kind of reason an object generates in virtue of having aesthetic value. 4. The AQ is a request for the differentia of aesthetic value. 5. An adequate answer to the AQ must meet the perceptual constraint; that is, it must articulate the sense in which aesthetic value is perceptual. 6. The AVQ is a request for a genus-differentia definition of aesthetic value. 7. The answer to the AVQ = the answer to the VQ + the answer to the AQ. Now for the doubts. Suppose that aesthetic value stands to value, not as red triangle stands to triangle, but as red stands to color. Suppose, in other words, that rather than standing in a traditional species-genus relation to value, aesthetic value is a determinate of the determinable value. Then the AVQ would not reduce to the VQ and the AQ. The AVQ would not reduce, even in part, to the VQ, because the answer to the AVQ would be epistemically prior to the answer to the VQ. Nor would the AVQ reduce, even in part, to the AQ, because the AQ and the AVQ would be one and the same. Nor would the AVQ reduce to some other set of questions. It would be simple. But then each of the above assumptions would be false. Is the AVQ simple? I think so. Here, way too briefly, is why. If the AVQ is compound, then an aesthetically valuable object is aesthetically valuable because it is valuable and because it is aesthetic, as a red triangle is a red triangle because it is a triangle and because it is red. If the AVQ is compound, in other words, the genus value and the differentia aesthetic are both ontologically prior to the species aesthetic value, as the genus triangle and the differentia red are both ontologically prior to the species red triangle. But the genus value would appear to be ontologically posterior to the species aesthetic value: an aesthetically valuable thing is not aesthetically valuable because valuable, but valuable because aesthetically valuable. The Dada Hari mosque, for instance, is not beautiful because valuable, but valuable because beautiful; its particular beauty is the determinate form its value takes, as its particular reddish-grayness is the determinate form its color takes. Nor is the differentia aesthetic ontologically prior to the species aesthetic value. Because the term “aesthetic” has no meaning except in relation to the value it designates, the species aesthetic value has no differentia, strictly speaking, except perhaps itself. Of course, the species aesthetic value differs from other forms of value, but it does so simply in respect of value, as the species red differs from other colors simply in respect of color.1 If the AVQ is simple, so too is its answer. The idea that an adequate answer to the AVQ must meet two constraints, one rational and one perceptual, is an artifact of the now discarded assumption that the AVQ is compound. An adequate answer to the AVQ must instead meet a single constraint, at once perceptual and rational. The irreducibility of this constraint shows itself in the impossibility of articulating the sense in which aesthetic value is perceptual without therein identifying the kind of reason an object generates in virtue of having aesthetic value, and vice-versa. Elsewhere I argue that aesthetic value is perceptual in the minimal sense that we perceive objects as having it (Shelley 2022). Assuming that is right, and taking the above constraint seriously, we get this: To perceive an object as having aesthetic value is to perceive it as being such as to generate whatever kind of reason an object generates in virtue of having aesthetic value. And so also this: The kind of reason an object generates in virtue of having aesthetic value is a reason to perceive it as having aesthetic value, that is, as being such as to generate that very reason. And so, finally, this: Aesthetic value is aesthetic value because an object’s having it is its being such as to generate a reason to perceive it as being such as to generate that very reason. That, in outline, is my answer to the AVQ. It expresses a simple theory of aesthetic value and implies a simple theory of aesthetic judgment, one according to which aesthetically judging an object to have aesthetic value is perceiving it to be such as to rationalize that very perception of it. It therefore adheres to the eighteenth-century precept that aesthetic value and aesthetic judgment are a conceptual pair.2 Some will be put off by the implication that we have aesthetic reasons only to aesthetically perceive; to them it will seem obvious that we have aesthetic reasons to do irreducibly many things. My reply is two-fold: first, that it is crucial, in this context, to distinguish the aesthetic reasons we have from the reasons we have because we have the aesthetic reasons we have, from which it follows, second, that it is crucial to have the theoretical resources to make that distinction. I am aware that I have raised many questions and answered few. Here is hoping I have at least raised some of the right ones. Footnotes 1 I am indebted here and elsewhere to Ford (2011, 82–3). 2 Kant (2000, 89) articulates this precept in his first footnote to the First Moment of “The Analytic of the Beautiful.” He then illustrates it in the four definitions of the beautiful he offers at the conclusion of each of the Four Moments (96, 104, 120, 124). Hume (1975, 299) illustrates this precept in the definition of beauty he gives in the Treatise. REFERENCES Ford , Anton. 2011 . “Action and Generality.” In Essays on Anscombe’s Intention , edited by Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby, and Frederick Stoutland, 76 – 104 . Harvard University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Hume , David. 1975 . A Treatise of Human Nature , 2nd ed. edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge. Revised by P.H. Nidditch. The Clarendon Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Kant , Immanuel. 2000 . Critique of the Power of Judgment , edited by Paul Guyer. Translated by Paul Guyer and Evan Matthews. Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Shelley , James. 2022 . “Intelligible Beauty.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96 : 147 – 64 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat © The Author(s) 2023. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Society for Aesthetics. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/pages/standard-publication-reuse-rights) http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism Oxford University Press

A Simple Theory of Aesthetic Value

Shelley, James
The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism , Volume 81 (1): 3 – Jan 12, 2023
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Oxford University Press
Copyright
© The Author(s) 2023. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Society for Aesthetics. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com
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0021-8529
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1540-6245
DOI
10.1093/jaac/kpac064
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Abstract

This article aims to answer the aesthetic-value question: (AVQ) What makes aesthetic value aesthetic value? If we have yet to answer it adequately, perhaps that is because we have yet to understand what we are asking for when we ask it. The first of this paper’s three ambitions, accordingly, is to catalog a series of assumptions we make when asking the AVQ. The second is to cast doubt on those assumptions. The third is to outline an answer that does not depend on them. Here, then, are the assumptions: The AVQ is compound, reducing to two simple questions: (AQ) What makes aesthetic value aesthetic? (VQ) What makes aesthetic value value? 2. The VQ is a request for the genus of aesthetic value. 3. An adequate answer to the VQ must meet the rational constraint; that is, it must identify the kind of reason an object generates in virtue of having aesthetic value. 4. The AQ is a request for the differentia of aesthetic value. 5. An adequate answer to the AQ must meet the perceptual constraint; that is, it must articulate the sense in which aesthetic value is perceptual. 6. The AVQ is a request for a genus-differentia definition of aesthetic value. 7. The answer to the AVQ = the answer to the VQ + the answer to the AQ. Now for the doubts. Suppose that aesthetic value stands to value, not as red triangle stands to triangle, but as red stands to color. Suppose, in other words, that rather than standing in a traditional species-genus relation to value, aesthetic value is a determinate of the determinable value. Then the AVQ would not reduce to the VQ and the AQ. The AVQ would not reduce, even in part, to the VQ, because the answer to the AVQ would be epistemically prior to the answer to the VQ. Nor would the AVQ reduce, even in part, to the AQ, because the AQ and the AVQ would be one and the same. Nor would the AVQ reduce to some other set of questions. It would be simple. But then each of the above assumptions would be false. Is the AVQ simple? I think so. Here, way too briefly, is why. If the AVQ is compound, then an aesthetically valuable object is aesthetically valuable because it is valuable and because it is aesthetic, as a red triangle is a red triangle because it is a triangle and because it is red. If the AVQ is compound, in other words, the genus value and the differentia aesthetic are both ontologically prior to the species aesthetic value, as the genus triangle and the differentia red are both ontologically prior to the species red triangle. But the genus value would appear to be ontologically posterior to the species aesthetic value: an aesthetically valuable thing is not aesthetically valuable because valuable, but valuable because aesthetically valuable. The Dada Hari mosque, for instance, is not beautiful because valuable, but valuable because beautiful; its particular beauty is the determinate form its value takes, as its particular reddish-grayness is the determinate form its color takes. Nor is the differentia aesthetic ontologically prior to the species aesthetic value. Because the term “aesthetic” has no meaning except in relation to the value it designates, the species aesthetic value has no differentia, strictly speaking, except perhaps itself. Of course, the species aesthetic value differs from other forms of value, but it does so simply in respect of value, as the species red differs from other colors simply in respect of color.1 If the AVQ is simple, so too is its answer. The idea that an adequate answer to the AVQ must meet two constraints, one rational and one perceptual, is an artifact of the now discarded assumption that the AVQ is compound. An adequate answer to the AVQ must instead meet a single constraint, at once perceptual and rational. The irreducibility of this constraint shows itself in the impossibility of articulating the sense in which aesthetic value is perceptual without therein identifying the kind of reason an object generates in virtue of having aesthetic value, and vice-versa. Elsewhere I argue that aesthetic value is perceptual in the minimal sense that we perceive objects as having it (Shelley 2022). Assuming that is right, and taking the above constraint seriously, we get this: To perceive an object as having aesthetic value is to perceive it as being such as to generate whatever kind of reason an object generates in virtue of having aesthetic value. And so also this: The kind of reason an object generates in virtue of having aesthetic value is a reason to perceive it as having aesthetic value, that is, as being such as to generate that very reason. And so, finally, this: Aesthetic value is aesthetic value because an object’s having it is its being such as to generate a reason to perceive it as being such as to generate that very reason. That, in outline, is my answer to the AVQ. It expresses a simple theory of aesthetic value and implies a simple theory of aesthetic judgment, one according to which aesthetically judging an object to have aesthetic value is perceiving it to be such as to rationalize that very perception of it. It therefore adheres to the eighteenth-century precept that aesthetic value and aesthetic judgment are a conceptual pair.2 Some will be put off by the implication that we have aesthetic reasons only to aesthetically perceive; to them it will seem obvious that we have aesthetic reasons to do irreducibly many things. My reply is two-fold: first, that it is crucial, in this context, to distinguish the aesthetic reasons we have from the reasons we have because we have the aesthetic reasons we have, from which it follows, second, that it is crucial to have the theoretical resources to make that distinction. I am aware that I have raised many questions and answered few. Here is hoping I have at least raised some of the right ones. Footnotes 1 I am indebted here and elsewhere to Ford (2011, 82–3). 2 Kant (2000, 89) articulates this precept in his first footnote to the First Moment of “The Analytic of the Beautiful.” He then illustrates it in the four definitions of the beautiful he offers at the conclusion of each of the Four Moments (96, 104, 120, 124). Hume (1975, 299) illustrates this precept in the definition of beauty he gives in the Treatise. REFERENCES Ford , Anton. 2011 . “Action and Generality.” In Essays on Anscombe’s Intention , edited by Anton Ford, Jennifer Hornsby, and Frederick Stoutland, 76 – 104 . Harvard University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Hume , David. 1975 . A Treatise of Human Nature , 2nd ed. edited by L. A. Selby-Bigge. Revised by P.H. Nidditch. The Clarendon Press . Google Scholar Google Preview OpenURL Placeholder Text WorldCat COPAC Kant , Immanuel. 2000 . Critique of the Power of Judgment , edited by Paul Guyer. Translated by Paul Guyer and Evan Matthews. Cambridge University Press . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS Google Preview WorldCat COPAC Shelley , James. 2022 . “Intelligible Beauty.” Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 96 : 147 – 64 . Google Scholar Crossref Search ADS WorldCat © The Author(s) 2023. Published by Oxford University Press on behalf of the American Society for Aesthetics. All rights reserved. For permissions, please e-mail: journals.permissions@oup.com This article is published and distributed under the terms of the Oxford University Press, Standard Journals Publication Model (https://academic.oup.com/pages/standard-publication-reuse-rights)

Journal

The Journal of Aesthetics and Art Criticism – Oxford University Press

Published: Jan 12, 2023

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