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I  *—The Presidential Address: Truth: The Identity Theory

I  *—The Presidential Address: Truth: The Identity Theory /*—The Presidential Address TRUTH: THE IDENTITY THEORY by Jennifer Hornsby want to promote what I shall call (unoriginally, and for the sake I of its having a name ) 'the identity theory of truth'. I suggest that other accounts put forward as theories of truth are genuine rivals to it, but are unacceptable. A certain conception of thinkables belongs with the identity theory's conception of truth. I introduce these conceptions in Part I, by reference to John McDowell's Mind and World; and I show why they have a place in an identity theory, which I introduce by reference to Frege. In Part II, I elaborate on the conception of thinkables, with a view to demonstrating that the identity theory's conception of truth is defensible. Part III is concerned with the theory's relation to some recent work on the concept of truth: I hope to show that the identity theorist not only has a defensible conception of truth, but also, in the present state of play, has appropriate ambitions. 1.1 McDowell introduced the notion of a thinkable in order to fend off a particular objection to the following claim (1994, p. 27). [T]here is no ontological gap between the sort http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society Oxford University Press

I  *—The Presidential Address: Truth: The Identity Theory

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society , Volume 97 (1): 24 – Jun 1, 1997

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References (23)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© The Aristotelian Society 1997
ISSN
0066-7374
eISSN
1467-9264
DOI
10.1111/1467-9264.00001
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

/*—The Presidential Address TRUTH: THE IDENTITY THEORY by Jennifer Hornsby want to promote what I shall call (unoriginally, and for the sake I of its having a name ) 'the identity theory of truth'. I suggest that other accounts put forward as theories of truth are genuine rivals to it, but are unacceptable. A certain conception of thinkables belongs with the identity theory's conception of truth. I introduce these conceptions in Part I, by reference to John McDowell's Mind and World; and I show why they have a place in an identity theory, which I introduce by reference to Frege. In Part II, I elaborate on the conception of thinkables, with a view to demonstrating that the identity theory's conception of truth is defensible. Part III is concerned with the theory's relation to some recent work on the concept of truth: I hope to show that the identity theorist not only has a defensible conception of truth, but also, in the present state of play, has appropriate ambitions. 1.1 McDowell introduced the notion of a thinkable in order to fend off a particular objection to the following claim (1994, p. 27). [T]here is no ontological gap between the sort

Journal

Proceedings of the Aristotelian SocietyOxford University Press

Published: Jun 1, 1997

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