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Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and Implications for Development Policy

Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and Implications for Development Policy Abstract This article explores the nature of property rights systems, their evolution, and their effect on resource allocation. It is argued that certain institutional arrangements for land rights have evolved in order to reduce uncertainty and increase efficiency in credit as well as in land markets. Of particular relevance to developing countries, the article emphasizes the contribution of public sector infrastructure to effective land rights systems. An appendix to the article presents a formal model analyzing the effects of security of land rights on land prices, the intensity of cultivation, and the use of credit. Empirical evidence from Thailand supports several of the propositions derived from the model. This content is only available as a PDF. Author notes " Gershon Feder is in the Agriculture and Rural Development Department of the World Bank. David Feeny is in the Department of Economics at McMaster University, Ontario, Canada. The authors acknowledge the helpful comments of Clive Bell, John Bruce, Karla Hoff, and several anonymous referees. © 1991 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png The World Bank Economic Review Oxford University Press

Land Tenure and Property Rights: Theory and Implications for Development Policy

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References (21)

Publisher
Oxford University Press
Copyright
© 1991 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK
ISSN
0258-6770
eISSN
1564-698X
DOI
10.1093/wber/5.1.135
Publisher site
See Article on Publisher Site

Abstract

Abstract This article explores the nature of property rights systems, their evolution, and their effect on resource allocation. It is argued that certain institutional arrangements for land rights have evolved in order to reduce uncertainty and increase efficiency in credit as well as in land markets. Of particular relevance to developing countries, the article emphasizes the contribution of public sector infrastructure to effective land rights systems. An appendix to the article presents a formal model analyzing the effects of security of land rights on land prices, the intensity of cultivation, and the use of credit. Empirical evidence from Thailand supports several of the propositions derived from the model. This content is only available as a PDF. Author notes " Gershon Feder is in the Agriculture and Rural Development Department of the World Bank. David Feeny is in the Department of Economics at McMaster University, Ontario, Canada. The authors acknowledge the helpful comments of Clive Bell, John Bruce, Karla Hoff, and several anonymous referees. © 1991 The International Bank for Reconstruction and Development / THE WORLD BANK

Journal

The World Bank Economic ReviewOxford University Press

Published: Jan 1, 1991

There are no references for this article.