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A Christian Approach to Corporate Religious LibertyGroup Ontology and Skeptical Arguments

A Christian Approach to Corporate Religious Liberty: Group Ontology and Skeptical Arguments [This chapter anticipates objections to the use of group ontology for the ascription of legal rights to corporate religious liberty. Three positions are addressed: first, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s attempt to eliminate the possibility of group agency for for-profit corporations; second, James D. Nelson’s social theory of conscience, which restricts group agency to a narrow range of group-types; and, third, Richard Schragger and Micah Schwartzman’s argument that group ontology is indeterminate and morally distracting for rights ascription. Especially through critical engagement with the latter theorists, the chapter ends with a basic framework for legal rights ascription, one that integrates group ontology and ethical concepts in a methodologically appropriate way. This framework is used to develop a Christian approach to corporate religious liberty.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Christian Approach to Corporate Religious LibertyGroup Ontology and Skeptical Arguments

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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
ISBN
978-3-030-56210-6
Pages
61 –102
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-56211-3_3
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[This chapter anticipates objections to the use of group ontology for the ascription of legal rights to corporate religious liberty. Three positions are addressed: first, Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg’s attempt to eliminate the possibility of group agency for for-profit corporations; second, James D. Nelson’s social theory of conscience, which restricts group agency to a narrow range of group-types; and, third, Richard Schragger and Micah Schwartzman’s argument that group ontology is indeterminate and morally distracting for rights ascription. Especially through critical engagement with the latter theorists, the chapter ends with a basic framework for legal rights ascription, one that integrates group ontology and ethical concepts in a methodologically appropriate way. This framework is used to develop a Christian approach to corporate religious liberty.]

Published: Sep 22, 2020

Keywords: Social ontology; Metaphysics; Corporate person; Political liberalism; Religious freedom

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