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Torben Spaak (2003)
Legal Positivism, Law's Normativity, and the Normative Force of Legal JustificationRatio Juris, 16
Christoph Kletzer (2008)
Der Kreis um Hans Kelsen
K. Olivecrona (1972)
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R. Dias (1963)
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I. Hedenius (1959)
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Alf Ross (2019)
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Max Rheinstein (1959)
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A. Wedberg (2008)
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[I argue in this chapter that the comparison between Olivecrona, on the one hand, and Hägerström and the other Scandinavian realists, on the other, makes it clear that Olivecrona’s legal philosophy is indeed a creation that nobody but Olivecrona can claim credit for. I argue, more specifically, that while Olivecrona adopts Hägerström’s ontological naturalism and non-cognitivist meta-ethics, he shows considerable independence in erecting a substantive legal philosophy on the basis of the philosophical foundation provided by Hägerström. I also argue that Olivecrona does not appear to have been much inspired by Lundstedt in his legal-philosophical work. While Olivecrona and Lundstedt shared many views, these views can be traced back to Hägerström’s writings. A case in point is that Olivecrona appears to accept Lundstedt’s view that the citizens tend to internalize the moral values and standards that make up the content of criminal law rules, although Olivecrona holds that the influence of the law, specifically the organized force of the law, is not limited to the field of criminal law, but is true across the board. Finally, I point out that Olivecrona and Ross agree on a number of important points, except the very basic question about the existence of legal relations. Thus they agree (i) about the analysis of the concept of a legal rule, although they make use of different terms to express this concept, and (ii) about the analysis of the concept of a legal right, and they also agree to a certain extent (iii) that law is a matter of organized force, though Olivecrona makes much more of this idea than does Ross.]
Published: Jun 18, 2014
Keywords: Legal Rule; Binding Force; Legal Philosophy; Legal Positivism; Legal Relation
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