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A logical Approach to PhilosophyAssertion, Proof, and the Axiom of Choice

A logical Approach to Philosophy: Assertion, Proof, and the Axiom of Choice [Where does this leave us? First, Williamson has not shown that an assertion theoretic account of meaning is impossible because of a commitment to luminosity. For as the PAT view demonstrates by its existence, it is possible to hold to a view that the meaning of a proposition is determined by its assertion conditions without thereby committing oneself to the luminosity of those assertion conditions. What Dummett insists on, and what he claims a realist, truth-conditional theory of meaning cannot obviously explain, is that a speaker should know the meanings of the sentences understood. So what is required is knowledge of the assertion conditions of these sentences. That, as we’ve seen, can be formulated in the manner employed by Martin-Löf and Tait, under which such knowledge doesn’t require luminosity, i.e., one in which it is possible that a speaker be mistaken in all the expected ways about whether those conditions obtain in a particular case.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A logical Approach to PhilosophyAssertion, Proof, and the Axiom of Choice

Part of the The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 69)
Editors: Devidi, David; Kenyon, Tim
DeVidi, David
A logical Approach to Philosophy — Jan 1, 2006
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Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer 2006
ISBN
978-1-4020-3533-3
Pages
45 –76
DOI
10.1007/1-4020-4054-7_4
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[Where does this leave us? First, Williamson has not shown that an assertion theoretic account of meaning is impossible because of a commitment to luminosity. For as the PAT view demonstrates by its existence, it is possible to hold to a view that the meaning of a proposition is determined by its assertion conditions without thereby committing oneself to the luminosity of those assertion conditions. What Dummett insists on, and what he claims a realist, truth-conditional theory of meaning cannot obviously explain, is that a speaker should know the meanings of the sentences understood. So what is required is knowledge of the assertion conditions of these sentences. That, as we’ve seen, can be formulated in the manner employed by Martin-Löf and Tait, under which such knowledge doesn’t require luminosity, i.e., one in which it is possible that a speaker be mistaken in all the expected ways about whether those conditions obtain in a particular case.]

Published: Jan 1, 2006

Keywords: Choice Function; Type Theory; Intuitionistic Logic; Knowledge Account; Constructive Logic

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