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A logical Approach to PhilosophyMonism: The One True Logic

A logical Approach to Philosophy: Monism: The One True Logic Chapter NINE Stephen Read Logical pluralism is the claim that different accounts of valid- ity can be equally correct. Beall and Restall have recently de- fended this position. Validity is a matter of truth-preservation over cases, they say: the conclusion should be true in every case in which the premises are true. Each logic specifies a class of cases, but differs over which cases should be consid- ered. I show that this account of logic is incoherent. Validity indeed is truth-preservation, provided this is properly under- stood. Once understood, there is one true logic, relevance logic. The source of Beall and Restall’s error is a recent habit of using a classical metalanguage to analyse non-classical log- ics generally, including relevance logic. 1 Logical Pluralism JC Beall and Greg Restall have recently defended a position they call “logical pluralism”, that “there is more than one sense in which arguments may be deductively valid, that these senses are equally good, and equally deserving of the name deductive validity” (Beall & Restall 2000, § 1). Their argument for logical pluralism is this: D. Devidi and T. Kenyon (eds.), A Logical Approach to Philosophy, 193-209. © 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands. 194 http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A logical Approach to PhilosophyMonism: The One True Logic

Part of the The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 69)
Editors: Devidi, David; Kenyon, Tim
Read, Stephen
A logical Approach to Philosophy — Jan 1, 2006
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References (18)

Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer 2006
ISBN
978-1-4020-3533-3
Pages
193 –209
DOI
10.1007/1-4020-4054-7_10
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

Chapter NINE Stephen Read Logical pluralism is the claim that different accounts of valid- ity can be equally correct. Beall and Restall have recently de- fended this position. Validity is a matter of truth-preservation over cases, they say: the conclusion should be true in every case in which the premises are true. Each logic specifies a class of cases, but differs over which cases should be consid- ered. I show that this account of logic is incoherent. Validity indeed is truth-preservation, provided this is properly under- stood. Once understood, there is one true logic, relevance logic. The source of Beall and Restall’s error is a recent habit of using a classical metalanguage to analyse non-classical log- ics generally, including relevance logic. 1 Logical Pluralism JC Beall and Greg Restall have recently defended a position they call “logical pluralism”, that “there is more than one sense in which arguments may be deductively valid, that these senses are equally good, and equally deserving of the name deductive validity” (Beall & Restall 2000, § 1). Their argument for logical pluralism is this: D. Devidi and T. Kenyon (eds.), A Logical Approach to Philosophy, 193-209. © 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands. 194

Published: Jan 1, 2006

Keywords: Classical Logic; True Logic; Relevance Logic; Classical Semantic; Impossible World

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