A logical Approach to PhilosophyNegation’s Holiday: Aspectival Dialetheism
A logical Approach to Philosophy: Negation’s Holiday: Aspectival Dialetheism
Beall, J C
2006-01-01 00:00:00
Chapter EIGHT NEGATION’S HOLIDAY: ASPECTIVAL DIALETHEISM JC Beall What does the Liar teach us about English? According to ‘orthodox’ dialetheism, as espoused by Graham Priest (us- ing his LP -based logic), the Liar teaches us that the negation of some true English sentence is true (and, hence, that En- glish is underwritten by a paraconsistent logic). That lesson, in addition to being very simple, avoids the familiar expres- sive problems that confront its (‘consistency’) rivals. I am inclined to accept dialetheism, although not the version ad- vanced by Priest. Liar-like sentences are true and false; how- ever, they are also sentences in which negation is on hol- iday, in a sense to be explained. Negation, I suggest, ex- hibits a ‘double-aspect’—behaving ‘classically,’ for the most part, but very non-classically (indeed, ‘free-floating’) when in- volved in paradoxical constructions. Some (many) philoso- phers think that the very meaning of ‘falsity’ rules out di- aletheism; the double-aspect hypothesis has a nice explana- tion of such thinking, and, indeed, acknowledges a sense in which it is correct. In addition, the double-aspect view avoids recent objections (by Field and Shapiro) against ‘orthodox’ dialetheism. In this paper I present a novel version of di- D.
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A logical Approach to PhilosophyNegation’s Holiday: Aspectival Dialetheism
Chapter EIGHT NEGATION’S HOLIDAY: ASPECTIVAL DIALETHEISM JC Beall What does the Liar teach us about English? According to ‘orthodox’ dialetheism, as espoused by Graham Priest (us- ing his LP -based logic), the Liar teaches us that the negation of some true English sentence is true (and, hence, that En- glish is underwritten by a paraconsistent logic). That lesson, in addition to being very simple, avoids the familiar expres- sive problems that confront its (‘consistency’) rivals. I am inclined to accept dialetheism, although not the version ad- vanced by Priest. Liar-like sentences are true and false; how- ever, they are also sentences in which negation is on hol- iday, in a sense to be explained. Negation, I suggest, ex- hibits a ‘double-aspect’—behaving ‘classically,’ for the most part, but very non-classically (indeed, ‘free-floating’) when in- volved in paradoxical constructions. Some (many) philoso- phers think that the very meaning of ‘falsity’ rules out di- aletheism; the double-aspect hypothesis has a nice explana- tion of such thinking, and, indeed, acknowledges a sense in which it is correct. In addition, the double-aspect view avoids recent objections (by Field and Shapiro) against ‘orthodox’ dialetheism. In this paper I present a novel version of di- D.
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