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A logical Approach to PhilosophyOn the Rational Reconstruction of Our Theoretical Knowledge

A logical Approach to Philosophy: On the Rational Reconstruction of Our Theoretical Knowledge Chapter FIVE ON THE RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION OF OUR THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE William Demopoulos 1 Introduction My focus in this paper is the rational reconstruction of physi- cal theories initially advanced by F.P. Ramsey, and later elabo- rated by Rudolf Carnap. As will become clear in what follows, the Carnap–Ramsey reconstruction of theoretical knowledge is a natural development of classical empiricist ideas, one that is informed by Russell’s philosophical logic and his theories of propositional understanding and knowledge of matter; as such, it is not merely a schematic representation of the notion of an empirical theory, but the backbone of a general account of our knowledge of the physical world. Nor is it merely an in- teresting episode in the history of the philosophy of science; Carnap–Ramsey is an illuminating, if not ultimately satisfy- ing, approach to epistemological problems that remain with us. To give a preliminary overview, the classical epistemologi- William Demopoulos, “On the Rational Reconstruction of our The- oretical Knowledge,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54(3) (2003), pp. 371–403. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press. D. Devidi and T. Kenyon (eds.), A Logical Approach to Philosophy, 84-127. © 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands. Rational Reconstruction http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A logical Approach to PhilosophyOn the Rational Reconstruction of Our Theoretical Knowledge

Part of the The Western Ontario Series in Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 69)
Editors: Devidi, David; Kenyon, Tim

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Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer 2006
ISBN
978-1-4020-3533-3
Pages
84 –127
DOI
10.1007/1-4020-4054-7_6
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

Chapter FIVE ON THE RATIONAL RECONSTRUCTION OF OUR THEORETICAL KNOWLEDGE William Demopoulos 1 Introduction My focus in this paper is the rational reconstruction of physi- cal theories initially advanced by F.P. Ramsey, and later elabo- rated by Rudolf Carnap. As will become clear in what follows, the Carnap–Ramsey reconstruction of theoretical knowledge is a natural development of classical empiricist ideas, one that is informed by Russell’s philosophical logic and his theories of propositional understanding and knowledge of matter; as such, it is not merely a schematic representation of the notion of an empirical theory, but the backbone of a general account of our knowledge of the physical world. Nor is it merely an in- teresting episode in the history of the philosophy of science; Carnap–Ramsey is an illuminating, if not ultimately satisfy- ing, approach to epistemological problems that remain with us. To give a preliminary overview, the classical epistemologi- William Demopoulos, “On the Rational Reconstruction of our The- oretical Knowledge,” British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 54(3) (2003), pp. 371–403. Reprinted by permission of Oxford University Press. D. Devidi and T. Kenyon (eds.), A Logical Approach to Philosophy, 84-127. © 2006 Springer. Printed in the Netherlands. Rational Reconstruction

Published: Jan 1, 2006

Keywords: Secondary System; Semantic View; Propositional Function; Intended Model; Phenomenal World

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