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A Phenomenological Revision of E. E. Harris's Dialectical HolismHarris’s Reformation of the “Hard Problem”

A Phenomenological Revision of E. E. Harris's Dialectical Holism: Harris’s Reformation of the... [As Harris’s philosophy of mind is fairly extensive, I confine my focus to only the central thread of his argument concerning efforts to naturalize subjectivity and knowledge. Towards this end, in Sect. 7.2, I clarify Harris’s anticipation of the autopoietic enactivism (AE) approach to consciousness. In this section I also establish a preliminary reformation of the hard problem to be elaborated in the following discussions. In Sect. 7.3, I assess Harris’s and Damasio’s respective appeals to Spinoza’s conception of ideatum as a model of mind and contrast these approaches with more recent arguments from embodied cognition. In Sect. 7.4 this line of thought is extended to Spinoza’s concept of conatus in order to clarify how Harris’s theory of self-awareness relates to corresponding views from embodied and embedded theses of mind.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Phenomenological Revision of E. E. Harris's Dialectical HolismHarris’s Reformation of the “Hard Problem”

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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
ISBN
978-3-030-65028-5
Pages
261 –292
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-65029-2_7
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[As Harris’s philosophy of mind is fairly extensive, I confine my focus to only the central thread of his argument concerning efforts to naturalize subjectivity and knowledge. Towards this end, in Sect. 7.2, I clarify Harris’s anticipation of the autopoietic enactivism (AE) approach to consciousness. In this section I also establish a preliminary reformation of the hard problem to be elaborated in the following discussions. In Sect. 7.3, I assess Harris’s and Damasio’s respective appeals to Spinoza’s conception of ideatum as a model of mind and contrast these approaches with more recent arguments from embodied cognition. In Sect. 7.4 this line of thought is extended to Spinoza’s concept of conatus in order to clarify how Harris’s theory of self-awareness relates to corresponding views from embodied and embedded theses of mind.]

Published: Oct 13, 2021

Keywords: 4E cognition; Spinoza; Hard problem; E.E. Harris

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