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A Philosophy of Person and IdentityCartesian People 1: The Body a Machine

A Philosophy of Person and Identity: Cartesian People 1: The Body a Machine [This chapter examines how Descartes envisages the relation between the immediately known mind and the only mediately known, mechanical body. We confront his ideas with the empirical case of IW, whom you might call a Cartesian human being: someone who has to consciously control his body. What strikes one most, is that this is someone who is severely handicapped. People usually do not have to operate their body like a machine. I investigate what IW is missing, namely proprioception, and discuss the anti-Cartesian argument that in proprioception you are as immediately conscious of your body as you are of your mind.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Philosophy of Person and IdentityCartesian People 1: The Body a Machine

Part of the Studies in Brain and Mind Book Series (volume 21)
Meijsing, Monica
A Philosophy of Person and Identity — Aug 5, 2022
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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022. Translation from the Dutch language edition: “Waar was ik toen ik er niet was? Een filosofie van persoon en identiteit” by Monica Meijsing, © 2018. Published by Uitgeverij Vantilt. All Rights Reserved.
ISBN
978-3-031-09523-8
Pages
29 –55
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-09524-5_4
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[This chapter examines how Descartes envisages the relation between the immediately known mind and the only mediately known, mechanical body. We confront his ideas with the empirical case of IW, whom you might call a Cartesian human being: someone who has to consciously control his body. What strikes one most, is that this is someone who is severely handicapped. People usually do not have to operate their body like a machine. I investigate what IW is missing, namely proprioception, and discuss the anti-Cartesian argument that in proprioception you are as immediately conscious of your body as you are of your mind.]

Published: Aug 5, 2022

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