A Philosophy of Person and IdentityCartesian People 2: The Body an Illusion
A Philosophy of Person and Identity: Cartesian People 2: The Body an Illusion
Meijsing, Monica
2022-08-05 00:00:00
[This chapter discusses the Cartesian doubt about the reality of the body. First, I describe the transition in philosophy from talking about the immaterial mind to talking about the material brain. Descartes’ thought experiment of the evil demon and its modern counterpart of the brain-in-a-vat are discussed: might we be mistaken about having a body, and be just non-material minds or brains-in-a-vat? And are phantom phenomena, the experiencing of non-existent limbs, an argument for that possibility?]
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A Philosophy of Person and IdentityCartesian People 2: The Body an Illusion
[This chapter discusses the Cartesian doubt about the reality of the body. First, I describe the transition in philosophy from talking about the immaterial mind to talking about the material brain. Descartes’ thought experiment of the evil demon and its modern counterpart of the brain-in-a-vat are discussed: might we be mistaken about having a body, and be just non-material minds or brains-in-a-vat? And are phantom phenomena, the experiencing of non-existent limbs, an argument for that possibility?]
Published: Aug 5, 2022
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