A Philosophy of Person and IdentityLockean Persons 1: Living Without Memory
A Philosophy of Person and Identity: Lockean Persons 1: Living Without Memory
Meijsing, Monica
2022-08-05 00:00:00
[The two previous chapters confronted Descartes’ view that we are essentially minds, and that the body does not really belong to ourselves, with empirical data on deafferentation and phantom phenomena. This chapter investigates whether Locke’s notion of a person fares any better.]
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A Philosophy of Person and IdentityLockean Persons 1: Living Without Memory
[The two previous chapters confronted Descartes’ view that we are essentially minds, and that the body does not really belong to ourselves, with empirical data on deafferentation and phantom phenomena. This chapter investigates whether Locke’s notion of a person fares any better.]
Published: Aug 5, 2022
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