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A Pluralist Theory of the MindBeyond Placement Problems

A Pluralist Theory of the Mind: Beyond Placement Problems [Contemporary metaphysics is dominated by “placement problems”. Given that we live in a fundamentally physical world, how can we make sense of the existence of abstract objects, consciousness, intentionality, normativity, modality, and so on? The aim of this introductory chapter is to challenge the framework of placement problems and to outline a pluralist alternative. I argue that the starting point for metaphysical discussions should not be physicalism or dualism but the staggering plurality of ontologies in scientific practice. While reduction and ontological unification often play an important role in scientific practice, there is no reason to assume that they must be successful everywhere. In contrast to the metaphysics of placement problems, I propose that we should adopt a conceptual pluralism that is grounded in a careful analysis of scientific practice. I specify this proposal by contrasting conceptual pluralism with a merely epistemological pluralism and a strong metaphysical pluralism. Contrary to a merely epistemological pluralism, conceptual pluralism rejects the ideal of global ontological unification and the ideal of exactly one fundamental ontology. Contrary to a strong metaphysical pluralism, conceptual pluralism interprets this ontological diversity in terms of diverse conceptual resources instead of metaphysically distinct realms of reality.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Pluralist Theory of the MindBeyond Placement Problems

Part of the European Studies in Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 2)
Ludwig, David
A Pluralist Theory of the Mind — Jul 10, 2015
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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
ISBN
978-3-319-22737-5
Pages
3 –18
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-22738-2_1
Publisher site
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Abstract

[Contemporary metaphysics is dominated by “placement problems”. Given that we live in a fundamentally physical world, how can we make sense of the existence of abstract objects, consciousness, intentionality, normativity, modality, and so on? The aim of this introductory chapter is to challenge the framework of placement problems and to outline a pluralist alternative. I argue that the starting point for metaphysical discussions should not be physicalism or dualism but the staggering plurality of ontologies in scientific practice. While reduction and ontological unification often play an important role in scientific practice, there is no reason to assume that they must be successful everywhere. In contrast to the metaphysics of placement problems, I propose that we should adopt a conceptual pluralism that is grounded in a careful analysis of scientific practice. I specify this proposal by contrasting conceptual pluralism with a merely epistemological pluralism and a strong metaphysical pluralism. Contrary to a merely epistemological pluralism, conceptual pluralism rejects the ideal of global ontological unification and the ideal of exactly one fundamental ontology. Contrary to a strong metaphysical pluralism, conceptual pluralism interprets this ontological diversity in terms of diverse conceptual resources instead of metaphysically distinct realms of reality.]

Published: Jul 10, 2015

Keywords: Scientific Practice; Placement Problem; Moral Truth; Phenomenal Consciousness; Reductive Explanation

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