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A Pluralist Theory of the MindConceptual Relativity in Science

A Pluralist Theory of the Mind: Conceptual Relativity in Science [This chapter discusses three case studies of conceptual relativity in scientific practice and their philosophical implications. I argue that scientists with different explanatory interests often recognize different patterns and therefore rely on different ontologies. I specify this claim by discussing three case studies (species, extended cognition, and intelligence) that illustrate conceptual relativity in the empirical sciences. I conclude that there is not only one correct answer to the question what species exist, not only one correct answer to the question whether extended cognitive processes exist, and not only one correct answer to the question how many intelligences exist. Furthermore, I argue that conceptual relativity in scientific practice is compatible with a realism that accepts moderate notions of natural kinds and insists that scientific entities exist in virtue of a reality that is largely independent of our conceptual choices. Finally, I argue that the ubiquity of conceptual relativity in scientific practice challenges metaphysicians who insist on the ideal of exactly one fundamental ontology in philosophy.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Pluralist Theory of the MindConceptual Relativity in Science

Part of the European Studies in Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 2)
Ludwig, David
A Pluralist Theory of the Mind — Jul 10, 2015
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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
ISBN
978-3-319-22737-5
Pages
47 –84
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-22738-2_4
Publisher site
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Abstract

[This chapter discusses three case studies of conceptual relativity in scientific practice and their philosophical implications. I argue that scientists with different explanatory interests often recognize different patterns and therefore rely on different ontologies. I specify this claim by discussing three case studies (species, extended cognition, and intelligence) that illustrate conceptual relativity in the empirical sciences. I conclude that there is not only one correct answer to the question what species exist, not only one correct answer to the question whether extended cognitive processes exist, and not only one correct answer to the question how many intelligences exist. Furthermore, I argue that conceptual relativity in scientific practice is compatible with a realism that accepts moderate notions of natural kinds and insists that scientific entities exist in virtue of a reality that is largely independent of our conceptual choices. Finally, I argue that the ubiquity of conceptual relativity in scientific practice challenges metaphysicians who insist on the ideal of exactly one fundamental ontology in philosophy.]

Published: Jul 10, 2015

Keywords: Conceptual Relativity; Natural Kind; Species Concept; Biological Species Concept; Homeostatic Property Cluster

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