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A Pluralist Theory of the MindConsciousness

A Pluralist Theory of the Mind: Consciousness [This chapter applies conceptual pluralism to debates about phenomenal consciousness. My arguments “from horizontal pluralism” and “from ontological non-fundamentalism” suggest that the reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness is an open empirical question. While standard arguments in philosophy of mind (e.g. Nagel’s bats, Jackson’s Mary, and Chalmers’ zombies) are supposed to illustrate a problematic “explanatory gap,” I argue that explanatory gaps are philosophically not more troubling than successful reductive explanations. Furthermore, I specify this strategy by comparing conceptual pluralism with current accounts of the “phenomenal concept strategy” (PCS). Conceptual pluralists and proponents of PCS share the idea that explanatory gaps are not due to differences between phenomenal and physical states but differences between phenomenal and physical concepts. However, proponents of PCS differ from conceptual pluralists by insisting on the physicalist commitment to the ontological priority of the physical. I argue that the commitment to physicalism undermines PCS and that a successful PCS needs to adopt a pluralist strategy.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Pluralist Theory of the MindConsciousness

Part of the European Studies in Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 2)
Ludwig, David
A Pluralist Theory of the Mind — Jul 10, 2015
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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
ISBN
978-3-319-22737-5
Pages
155 –171
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-22738-2_8
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[This chapter applies conceptual pluralism to debates about phenomenal consciousness. My arguments “from horizontal pluralism” and “from ontological non-fundamentalism” suggest that the reductive explanation of phenomenal consciousness is an open empirical question. While standard arguments in philosophy of mind (e.g. Nagel’s bats, Jackson’s Mary, and Chalmers’ zombies) are supposed to illustrate a problematic “explanatory gap,” I argue that explanatory gaps are philosophically not more troubling than successful reductive explanations. Furthermore, I specify this strategy by comparing conceptual pluralism with current accounts of the “phenomenal concept strategy” (PCS). Conceptual pluralists and proponents of PCS share the idea that explanatory gaps are not due to differences between phenomenal and physical states but differences between phenomenal and physical concepts. However, proponents of PCS differ from conceptual pluralists by insisting on the physicalist commitment to the ontological priority of the physical. I argue that the commitment to physicalism undermines PCS and that a successful PCS needs to adopt a pluralist strategy.]

Published: Jul 10, 2015

Keywords: Mental Causation; Phenomenal Property; Phenomenal Concept; Phenomenal State; Phenomenal Consciousness

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