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A Pluralist Theory of the MindThe Argument from Horizontal Pluralism

A Pluralist Theory of the Mind: The Argument from Horizontal Pluralism [The aim of this chapter is to discuss the relation between conceptual relativity, reduction, and reductive explanation. I start with the distinction between horizontal and vertical pluralism. Horizontal pluralism is concerned with different ontologies within a domain and illustrated by my discussions of species, extended cognition, and intelligence. Vertical pluralism is concerned with the relation between entities across domains such as psychology, biology, and physics. Following Dupré, I argue that horizontal pluralism undermines the assumption that we will always find coextensive kinds on a vertical scale. For example, many legitimate biological kinds correspond to vastly different physical kinds. Horizontal pluralism therefore supports multiple realization and casts doubts on traditional theory reductions. At the same time, I acknowledge that criticism of theory reductions is not sufficient for a substantive pluralism as many philosophers have argued for more moderate accounts of reductive explanation that are supposed to be compatible with multiple realization. While I suggest that “reductive explanation without reduction” can be important in scientific practice, I also argue that this strategy does not solve all problems that are raised by horizontal pluralism. Often, there will be no reductive explanation of the properties that are shared by members of the same kind and reductivists are forced to endorse an implausible eliminativism about biological and cognitive properties.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Pluralist Theory of the MindThe Argument from Horizontal Pluralism

Part of the European Studies in Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 2)
Ludwig, David
A Pluralist Theory of the Mind — Jul 10, 2015
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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
ISBN
978-3-319-22737-5
Pages
103 –136
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-22738-2_6
Publisher site
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Abstract

[The aim of this chapter is to discuss the relation between conceptual relativity, reduction, and reductive explanation. I start with the distinction between horizontal and vertical pluralism. Horizontal pluralism is concerned with different ontologies within a domain and illustrated by my discussions of species, extended cognition, and intelligence. Vertical pluralism is concerned with the relation between entities across domains such as psychology, biology, and physics. Following Dupré, I argue that horizontal pluralism undermines the assumption that we will always find coextensive kinds on a vertical scale. For example, many legitimate biological kinds correspond to vastly different physical kinds. Horizontal pluralism therefore supports multiple realization and casts doubts on traditional theory reductions. At the same time, I acknowledge that criticism of theory reductions is not sufficient for a substantive pluralism as many philosophers have argued for more moderate accounts of reductive explanation that are supposed to be compatible with multiple realization. While I suggest that “reductive explanation without reduction” can be important in scientific practice, I also argue that this strategy does not solve all problems that are raised by horizontal pluralism. Often, there will be no reductive explanation of the properties that are shared by members of the same kind and reductivists are forced to endorse an implausible eliminativism about biological and cognitive properties.]

Published: Jul 10, 2015

Keywords: Natural Kind; Multiple Realization; Theory Reduction; Moral Fact; Phenomenal Consciousness

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