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A Pluralist Theory of the MindThe Argument from Ontological Non-fundamentalism

A Pluralist Theory of the Mind: The Argument from Ontological Non-fundamentalism [The aim of this chapter is to argue for a non-reductivism that considers the scope of reductive explanations an open empirical question. Non-reductivism in this sense has to be distinguished from both reductivism and anti-reductivism. I start with the question why many contemporary philosophers consider reductivism a plausible or even an inevitable position. Given that there is hardly any inductive evidence for the truth of reductivism, I suggest that the main motivation for reductivism is the metaphysical idea of the ontological priority of the physical. This idea can be developed in a variety of ways. For example, one can specify the priority of the physical by arguing that only physical entities fundamentally exist. While this specification directly contradicts conceptual relativity, there are also more moderate (e.g. supervenience-based) specifications of the idea of ontological priority. I consider different specifications and argue that none of them are (a) compatible with conceptual relativity, (b) non-circular, and (c) strong enough to justify reductivism. I therefore conclude that conceptual relativity undermines the crucial motivation of reductivism and leads to non-reductivism.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Pluralist Theory of the MindThe Argument from Ontological Non-fundamentalism

Part of the European Studies in Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 2)
Ludwig, David
A Pluralist Theory of the Mind — Jul 10, 2015
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References (21)

Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© Springer International Publishing Switzerland 2015
ISBN
978-3-319-22737-5
Pages
137 –151
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-22738-2_7
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[The aim of this chapter is to argue for a non-reductivism that considers the scope of reductive explanations an open empirical question. Non-reductivism in this sense has to be distinguished from both reductivism and anti-reductivism. I start with the question why many contemporary philosophers consider reductivism a plausible or even an inevitable position. Given that there is hardly any inductive evidence for the truth of reductivism, I suggest that the main motivation for reductivism is the metaphysical idea of the ontological priority of the physical. This idea can be developed in a variety of ways. For example, one can specify the priority of the physical by arguing that only physical entities fundamentally exist. While this specification directly contradicts conceptual relativity, there are also more moderate (e.g. supervenience-based) specifications of the idea of ontological priority. I consider different specifications and argue that none of them are (a) compatible with conceptual relativity, (b) non-circular, and (c) strong enough to justify reductivism. I therefore conclude that conceptual relativity undermines the crucial motivation of reductivism and leads to non-reductivism.]

Published: Jul 10, 2015

Keywords: Conceptual Relativity; Scientific Practice; Physical Entity; Reductive Explanation; Fundamental Ontology

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