Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

A Post-WTO International Legal OrderIf the WTO Were to Break Down Completely, Would We Stoop and Build It Up with Worn-Out Tools?

A Post-WTO International Legal Order: If the WTO Were to Break Down Completely, Would We Stoop... [This chapter uses existing tools of public choice theory to predict how governments would behave in the absence of the set of constraints and incentives provided by WTO obligations. It argues that any attempt to overcome protectionist behaviour would need to incorporate the interest of exporters and the interest of other constituents pursuing non-protectionist regulatory goals. It shows how the existing WTO rules and its dispute settlement mechanism have largely incorporated such diverse interests and that the key to doing so has been the incorporation of the principles of the Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare into WTO rules. It concludes that if the WTO breaks down completely, there will be a need to construct a new regime for international trade regulation which would require similar sets of rules to restrain protectionist behaviour and strike a balance between liberalizing trade and preserving policy space, and that it would be of critical importance that such rules incorporate the guidance provided by the Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare, just as well or even better than the existing WTO rules do.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Post-WTO International Legal OrderIf the WTO Were to Break Down Completely, Would We Stoop and Build It Up with Worn-Out Tools?

Editors: Lewis, Meredith Kolsky; Nakagawa, Junji; Neuwirth, Rostam J.; Picker, Colin B.; Stoll, Peter-Tobias

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer-journals/a-post-wto-international-legal-order-if-the-wto-were-to-break-down-wWvZ5pOXHD

References (23)

Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2020
ISBN
978-3-030-45427-2
Pages
93 –112
DOI
10.1007/978-3-030-45428-9_6
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[This chapter uses existing tools of public choice theory to predict how governments would behave in the absence of the set of constraints and incentives provided by WTO obligations. It argues that any attempt to overcome protectionist behaviour would need to incorporate the interest of exporters and the interest of other constituents pursuing non-protectionist regulatory goals. It shows how the existing WTO rules and its dispute settlement mechanism have largely incorporated such diverse interests and that the key to doing so has been the incorporation of the principles of the Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare into WTO rules. It concludes that if the WTO breaks down completely, there will be a need to construct a new regime for international trade regulation which would require similar sets of rules to restrain protectionist behaviour and strike a balance between liberalizing trade and preserving policy space, and that it would be of critical importance that such rules incorporate the guidance provided by the Generalized Theory of Distortions and Welfare, just as well or even better than the existing WTO rules do.]

Published: Jun 17, 2020

There are no references for this article.