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A Primal Perspective on the Philosophy of ReligionThe Problem of Verification

A Primal Perspective on the Philosophy of Religion: The Problem of Verification CHAPTER XI The Question of Verifiability The two previous chapters were devoted to the examination of the nature of religious language, both in general and as it applied specifically to the case of primal religions. In these two chapters the claims that religious language is cognitive were explored first. This was followed by an exploration of views according to which the nature of religious language is essentially noncognitive. It is now time to revert to a consideration of the traditional claim, that the nature of religious language is cognitive; but in a modern context. This context is provided by the development of logical positivism and allied theories in the field of philosophy. We will now attempt to juxtapose the traditional religious claim regarding the cognitive nature of language, with the tests established in modern analytical philosophy to verify such claims. Before proceeding further let us revisit both these points to render the exercise more meaningful and fruitful. One may begin by reasserting, with John Hick, the traditional view regarding the cognitive nature of religious language (lest the claim may have been diluted in the course of the subsequent discussion). In implicit opposition to all noncognitive accounts of religious language, http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Primal Perspective on the Philosophy of ReligionThe Problem of Verification

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Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer 2006
ISBN
978-1-4020-5013-8
Pages
157 –170
DOI
10.1007/1-4020-5014-3_11
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

CHAPTER XI The Question of Verifiability The two previous chapters were devoted to the examination of the nature of religious language, both in general and as it applied specifically to the case of primal religions. In these two chapters the claims that religious language is cognitive were explored first. This was followed by an exploration of views according to which the nature of religious language is essentially noncognitive. It is now time to revert to a consideration of the traditional claim, that the nature of religious language is cognitive; but in a modern context. This context is provided by the development of logical positivism and allied theories in the field of philosophy. We will now attempt to juxtapose the traditional religious claim regarding the cognitive nature of language, with the tests established in modern analytical philosophy to verify such claims. Before proceeding further let us revisit both these points to render the exercise more meaningful and fruitful. One may begin by reasserting, with John Hick, the traditional view regarding the cognitive nature of religious language (lest the claim may have been diluted in the course of the subsequent discussion). In implicit opposition to all noncognitive accounts of religious language,

Published: Jan 1, 2006

Keywords: Sociological Theory; Human Awareness; Religious Language; John Hick; Factual Assertion

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