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CHAPTER VII The human reaction to revelation is faith, or lack of it. We discovered earlier “that the universe is religiously ambiguous – capable of being construed Revelation encourages us to construe both religiously and naturalistically.” it religiously but it cannot convince us that such is the case; only we can convince ourselves, hence the expression ‘voluntarist theories of faith.’ Seven ways of doing so have been proposed, both in the case of propositional and non-propositional views of revelation. Some of these proposals may now be examined. One may begin, however, by making at least an initial case for the comparability of the phenomenon of faith in Christianity and primal cultures. E. Durkheim has devoted some attention to this issue in the context of his discussion of the Australian aboriginal ceremony known as Intichiuma, which is widely practised by the Aboriginal tribe with the objective of assuring “the prosperity of the animal or vegetable species serving the clan as totem.” After analyzing these and other rites he concludes: The true justification of religious practices does not lie in the apparent ends which they pursue, but rather in the invisible action which they exercise over the mind and in the
Published: Jan 1, 2006
Keywords: Ultimate Concern; John Hick; Invisible Action; Propositional View; Epistemic Distance
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