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A Reading of Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense Frege’s Paradox and the Serial Form

A Reading of Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense : Frege’s Paradox and the Serial Form [At the beginning of Logic of Sense, Deleuze defines paradox as “the affirmation of both senses or directions at once” (“le paradoxe est l’affirmation des deux sens a la fois”; LdS 9; LoS 1), and then he elaborates different paradoxes of sense. Thus, there are several aspects on which sense implies the affirmation of two directions at once. This affirmation is crucial to sense. As Paul Livingston in his chapter on Deleuze declares, the paradoxical aspect of sense is connected to the way it underlies becoming: “Sense for Deleuze also underlies the instability of meaning and, even more generally, the phenomena of change, flux, and becoming”, and he continues by claiming that the paradoxical aspect or the “bidirectionality” of sense “is necessary for understanding change and becoming” (Livingston, 2012: 96–97). In this regard, Deleuze’s account of sense is related to the second type of being which Plato recognizes in Parmenides and Philebus: “Pure becoming without measure, a veritable becoming-mad which never rests … and indocile matter” (LdS 9; LoS 1–2). Plato’s examples of these entities are that which is denoted by the words such as “hotter”, “colder” or “younger.” They do not denote the stable and established beings which suppose pauses and rests to be able to receive the action of the Ideas. They denote being as becoming, being as expressing itself in a diversity of modes. And as Plato’s examples indicate, being as becoming appears only in language. It is being as sense, as linguistic sense. The change that Deleuze makes here is replacing Plato’s comparative adjectives with infinitive verbs (this replacement is based on the Stoic reading and will be discussed in detail in next chapter). This replacement entails a move from “becoming” to “the event”.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Reading of Gilles Deleuze’s Logic of Sense Frege’s Paradox and the Serial Form

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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023
ISBN
978-3-031-13705-1
Pages
53 –81
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-13706-8_3
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[At the beginning of Logic of Sense, Deleuze defines paradox as “the affirmation of both senses or directions at once” (“le paradoxe est l’affirmation des deux sens a la fois”; LdS 9; LoS 1), and then he elaborates different paradoxes of sense. Thus, there are several aspects on which sense implies the affirmation of two directions at once. This affirmation is crucial to sense. As Paul Livingston in his chapter on Deleuze declares, the paradoxical aspect of sense is connected to the way it underlies becoming: “Sense for Deleuze also underlies the instability of meaning and, even more generally, the phenomena of change, flux, and becoming”, and he continues by claiming that the paradoxical aspect or the “bidirectionality” of sense “is necessary for understanding change and becoming” (Livingston, 2012: 96–97). In this regard, Deleuze’s account of sense is related to the second type of being which Plato recognizes in Parmenides and Philebus: “Pure becoming without measure, a veritable becoming-mad which never rests … and indocile matter” (LdS 9; LoS 1–2). Plato’s examples of these entities are that which is denoted by the words such as “hotter”, “colder” or “younger.” They do not denote the stable and established beings which suppose pauses and rests to be able to receive the action of the Ideas. They denote being as becoming, being as expressing itself in a diversity of modes. And as Plato’s examples indicate, being as becoming appears only in language. It is being as sense, as linguistic sense. The change that Deleuze makes here is replacing Plato’s comparative adjectives with infinitive verbs (this replacement is based on the Stoic reading and will be discussed in detail in next chapter). This replacement entails a move from “becoming” to “the event”.]

Published: Nov 8, 2022

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