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A Theory of Causation in the Social and Biological SciencesGetting Rid of Interventions

A Theory of Causation in the Social and Biological Sciences: Getting Rid of Interventions [Chapters 2 and 3 stressed the virtues of Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation; Chapter 2 diagnosed that the interventionist theory conforms to, or at least promises to conform to, the naturalist criterion and the distinction criterion of adequacy. Consequently, the interventionist theory of causation, prima facie, appears to be a candidate for an adequate explication of causation in the social sciences, and, hopefully, of causation in the special sciences in general. This is, at first glance, a great success for Woodward’s interventionist theory. Chapter 3 drew attention to a problem for interventionists: they fail to provide an explicit account of the truth conditions of interventionist counterfactuals, the building blocks of the interventionist theory of causation. For the sake of argument, I argued in favour of the interventionist theory by proposing three different semantics for interventionist counterfactuals (i.e., the interventionist versions of possible worlds semantics, Goodmanian semantics, and the suppositional theory).] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Theory of Causation in the Social and Biological SciencesGetting Rid of Interventions

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Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan UK
Copyright
© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2013
ISBN
978-1-349-44799-2
Pages
104 –124
DOI
10.1057/9781137281043_4
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[Chapters 2 and 3 stressed the virtues of Woodward’s interventionist theory of causation; Chapter 2 diagnosed that the interventionist theory conforms to, or at least promises to conform to, the naturalist criterion and the distinction criterion of adequacy. Consequently, the interventionist theory of causation, prima facie, appears to be a candidate for an adequate explication of causation in the social sciences, and, hopefully, of causation in the special sciences in general. This is, at first glance, a great success for Woodward’s interventionist theory. Chapter 3 drew attention to a problem for interventionists: they fail to provide an explicit account of the truth conditions of interventionist counterfactuals, the building blocks of the interventionist theory of causation. For the sake of argument, I argued in favour of the interventionist theory by proposing three different semantics for interventionist counterfactuals (i.e., the interventionist versions of possible worlds semantics, Goodmanian semantics, and the suppositional theory).]

Published: Oct 6, 2015

Keywords: Truth Condition; Actual World; Agency Theory; Causal Claim; Causal Path

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