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A Theory of Causation in the Social and Biological SciencesNon-Universal Laws

A Theory of Causation in the Social and Biological Sciences: Non-Universal Laws [Chapter 4 presented arguments against the interventionist assumption that interventions are required to be merely logically possible. That is, the notion of an intervention is troubled, because either interventions are dispensable (with respect to stating the truth conditions for causal statements and counterfactuals), or the modal character leads to the incorrect semantic evaluation of interventionist counterfactuals. These conclusions create a follow-up problem for interventionists concerning laws of nature. If one accepts the naturalist criteria of adequacy (see Chapter 1, pp. 15–21), then any theory of causation for the special sciences has to account for the no-universal-laws requirement. Interventionists respect and, prima facie, satisfy this requirement as criterion of adequacy: according to the interventionist view, causation requires invariant relationships between cause and effect. These invariant relations are described by invariant generalizations, which are not required to be universal. Hence, the no-universal-laws requirement appears to be satisfied. However, the invariance of generalizations is defined in terms of possible interventions; that is, a generalization is invariant under possible interventions. This is unfortunate for interventionists, because the notion of a possible intervention is a troubled one, as argued in Chapter 4. In what follows, it will be argued for the claim that one can account for the no-universal-laws-requirement without appealing to the notion of an intervention.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Theory of Causation in the Social and Biological SciencesNon-Universal Laws

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Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan UK
Copyright
© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2013
ISBN
978-1-349-44799-2
Pages
125 –145
DOI
10.1057/9781137281043_5
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[Chapter 4 presented arguments against the interventionist assumption that interventions are required to be merely logically possible. That is, the notion of an intervention is troubled, because either interventions are dispensable (with respect to stating the truth conditions for causal statements and counterfactuals), or the modal character leads to the incorrect semantic evaluation of interventionist counterfactuals. These conclusions create a follow-up problem for interventionists concerning laws of nature. If one accepts the naturalist criteria of adequacy (see Chapter 1, pp. 15–21), then any theory of causation for the special sciences has to account for the no-universal-laws requirement. Interventionists respect and, prima facie, satisfy this requirement as criterion of adequacy: according to the interventionist view, causation requires invariant relationships between cause and effect. These invariant relations are described by invariant generalizations, which are not required to be universal. Hence, the no-universal-laws requirement appears to be satisfied. However, the invariance of generalizations is defined in terms of possible interventions; that is, a generalization is invariant under possible interventions. This is unfortunate for interventionists, because the notion of a possible intervention is a troubled one, as argued in Chapter 4. In what follows, it will be argued for the claim that one can account for the no-universal-laws-requirement without appealing to the notion of an intervention.]

Published: Oct 6, 2015

Keywords: Special Science; Disturbing Factor; Interventionist Theory; Minimal Invariance; Lawish Generalization

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