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A Theory of Epistemic JustificationCounterexamples

A Theory of Epistemic Justification: Counterexamples [Is the reliability of the process by which a belief is formed necessary for the belief’s justification? Are there not justified beliefs that would have been formed though false, by the method that did form them, even under normal conditions? Consider a person who mistakes certain bushes for trees, but is a reliable identifier of redwood trees. Observing a redwood, he believes justifiedly that there is a tree before him and this belief is justified, but he might have held this belief falsely by observing a bush.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Theory of Epistemic JustificationCounterexamples

Part of the Philosophical Studies Series Book Series (volume 112)

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Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer Netherlands 2009
ISBN
978-1-4020-9566-5
Pages
179 –197
DOI
10.1007/978-1-4020-9567-2_10
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[Is the reliability of the process by which a belief is formed necessary for the belief’s justification? Are there not justified beliefs that would have been formed though false, by the method that did form them, even under normal conditions? Consider a person who mistakes certain bushes for trees, but is a reliable identifier of redwood trees. Observing a redwood, he believes justifiedly that there is a tree before him and this belief is justified, but he might have held this belief falsely by observing a bush.]

Published: Jan 1, 2009

Keywords: Actual World; Semantic Content; Logical Necessity; Epistemic Goal; Skeptical Scenario

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