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A Theory of Epistemic JustificationInference

A Theory of Epistemic Justification: Inference [Truth-preserving inference from reliably formed beliefs is a reliable method of forming beliefs. Beliefs formed by truth-preserving inference from beliefs formed by a method that would not, under normal conditions, have produced them had they been false will not, under normal conditions, be false. For, truth-preserving inference from truths yields truths under all conditions. Thus, truth-preserving inference from reliably formed beliefs satisfies the first clause of condition A of my theory. If the beliefs from which one infers also satisfy the second clause of A and are thereby justified, then the beliefs inferred will also satisfy this clause and be justified. For a justified belief incompatible with an inferred belief must also be incompatible with beliefs that support the inference. Hence, truth-preserving inference from beliefs justified under A yields beliefs justified under A. By condition B, a good reason to believe that one’s belief is formed by truth-preserving inference from beliefs justified under A justifies holding the belief.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Theory of Epistemic JustificationInference

Part of the Philosophical Studies Series Book Series (volume 112)

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Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer Netherlands 2009
ISBN
978-1-4020-9566-5
Pages
71 –96
DOI
10.1007/978-1-4020-9567-2_5
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[Truth-preserving inference from reliably formed beliefs is a reliable method of forming beliefs. Beliefs formed by truth-preserving inference from beliefs formed by a method that would not, under normal conditions, have produced them had they been false will not, under normal conditions, be false. For, truth-preserving inference from truths yields truths under all conditions. Thus, truth-preserving inference from reliably formed beliefs satisfies the first clause of condition A of my theory. If the beliefs from which one infers also satisfy the second clause of A and are thereby justified, then the beliefs inferred will also satisfy this clause and be justified. For a justified belief incompatible with an inferred belief must also be incompatible with beliefs that support the inference. Hence, truth-preserving inference from beliefs justified under A yields beliefs justified under A. By condition B, a good reason to believe that one’s belief is formed by truth-preserving inference from beliefs justified under A justifies holding the belief.]

Published: Jan 1, 2009

Keywords: Black Hole; Entailment Relation; Evidential Relation; Reliability Property; Epistemic Goal

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