A Theory of Epistemic Justification: Reliability
Leplin, Jarrett
2009-01-01 00:00:00
[I propose to explicate truth-conduciveness in terms of reliability. In this chapter I shall be concerned both with the reliability of processes or methods by which beliefs are formed, and with the reliability of the formation of beliefs. These are distinct notions. Each incorporates a condition unique to the theory of justification I shall propose: The reliability of methods introduces a condition of normalcy, and the reliability of belief-formation introduces a condition of intentionality. Much of this chapter is devoted to explaining these conditions and applying them to problems raised by the notion of reliability.]
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[I propose to explicate truth-conduciveness in terms of reliability. In this chapter I shall be concerned both with the reliability of processes or methods by which beliefs are formed, and with the reliability of the formation of beliefs. These are distinct notions. Each incorporates a condition unique to the theory of justification I shall propose: The reliability of methods introduces a condition of normalcy, and the reliability of belief-formation introduces a condition of intentionality. Much of this chapter is devoted to explaining these conditions and applying them to problems raised by the notion of reliability.]
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