Get 20M+ Full-Text Papers For Less Than $1.50/day. Start a 14-Day Trial for You or Your Team.

Learn More →

A Theory of Epistemic JustificationSkepticism

A Theory of Epistemic Justification: Skepticism [Skepticism is still a potential problem for my theory. Although the dissociation of justification from probability does not vitiate the justification of ordinary beliefs, perhaps skeptical implications of my transmission principles do. If I am justified in believing that I have hands, inference from this belief entitles me to believe justifiedly that I am not the victim of a skeptical scenario in which I do not have hands but merely appear to. But in denying that I am the victim of such a skeptical scenario, I commit myself to the truth of a proposition of whose falsity I could have no indication. There is some plausibility to the principle that one cannot be justified in believing a proposition whose falsity one would be unable to detect. On this principle (DP; “D” for detectable, not for detected), CJE precludes my believing justifiedly that I have hands.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Theory of Epistemic JustificationSkepticism

Part of the Philosophical Studies Series Book Series (volume 112)

Loading next page...
 
/lp/springer-journals/a-theory-of-epistemic-justification-skepticism-nceDPzNy0T

References (0)

References for this paper are not available at this time. We will be adding them shortly, thank you for your patience.

Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer Netherlands 2009
ISBN
978-1-4020-9566-5
Pages
111 –142
DOI
10.1007/978-1-4020-9567-2_7
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[Skepticism is still a potential problem for my theory. Although the dissociation of justification from probability does not vitiate the justification of ordinary beliefs, perhaps skeptical implications of my transmission principles do. If I am justified in believing that I have hands, inference from this belief entitles me to believe justifiedly that I am not the victim of a skeptical scenario in which I do not have hands but merely appear to. But in denying that I am the victim of such a skeptical scenario, I commit myself to the truth of a proposition of whose falsity I could have no indication. There is some plausibility to the principle that one cannot be justified in believing a proposition whose falsity one would be unable to detect. On this principle (DP; “D” for detectable, not for detected), CJE precludes my believing justifiedly that I have hands.]

Published: Jan 1, 2009

Keywords: Actual World; Knowledge Attribution; Doxastic Attitude; Skeptical Argument; Epistemic Property

There are no references for this article.