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A Theory of Practical ReasonStructural Rationality

A Theory of Practical Reason: Structural Rationality [John Rawls, who originally presented his theory of justice as an application of the rational choice model, distinguished reason from rationality in his later writings. He defines rationality instrumentally, that is, choosing the adequate means to an end, while he links reasons to reasoning, that is, giving reasons. This juxtaposition results in a dichotomy within practical philosophy for which, I believe, there are no good reasons, but at best habitually established patterns of argumentation in economics, social sciences and practical philosophy. If reason and rationality, that is, practical reason and rationality, represented different assessment criteria, it would be possible that compelling reasons speak against a rational action. An action could be unreasonable but also rational.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Theory of Practical ReasonStructural Rationality

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Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023
ISBN
978-3-031-17318-9
Pages
15 –43
DOI
10.1007/978-3-031-17319-6_3
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[John Rawls, who originally presented his theory of justice as an application of the rational choice model, distinguished reason from rationality in his later writings. He defines rationality instrumentally, that is, choosing the adequate means to an end, while he links reasons to reasoning, that is, giving reasons. This juxtaposition results in a dichotomy within practical philosophy for which, I believe, there are no good reasons, but at best habitually established patterns of argumentation in economics, social sciences and practical philosophy. If reason and rationality, that is, practical reason and rationality, represented different assessment criteria, it would be possible that compelling reasons speak against a rational action. An action could be unreasonable but also rational.]

Published: Mar 9, 2023

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