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A Theory of TrucesThe Legitimacy of Truce Thinking

A Theory of Truces: The Legitimacy of Truce Thinking [In Chapter 1, I argued that truce makers typically display one or more of the following five commitments: (1) An optimism about the passage of time; an assumption that “buying time” may change the circumstances that make a more comprehensive peace deal impossible. (2) A belief that partial, modest arrangements or agreements can both alleviate living conditions for those involved in chronic conflict and improve mutual attitudes. Here we made use of Camus’s (unheeded) call for a civilian truce in Algeria and Randall Forsberg’s nuclear freeze manifesto circulated in the 1980s. (3) A realization that intractable ideological foes don’t have to fight in the name of their incommensurate ideologies. Here we drew on George Kennan’s Long Telegram and subsequent X article. (4) A conviction that waging war in the name of abstract principles or a virtuous political self-understanding may make wars longer and bloodier than they have to be. Here we used Hume’s essay “Of the Balance of Powers.” (5) A belief that truces can be helpful in resting and rearming for a future round of conflict. These five considerations, taken collectively, were labeled “truce thinking.”] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Theory of TrucesThe Legitimacy of Truce Thinking

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Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan UK
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2015
ISBN
978-1-349-55273-3
Pages
28 –43
DOI
10.1057/9781137385956_3
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[In Chapter 1, I argued that truce makers typically display one or more of the following five commitments: (1) An optimism about the passage of time; an assumption that “buying time” may change the circumstances that make a more comprehensive peace deal impossible. (2) A belief that partial, modest arrangements or agreements can both alleviate living conditions for those involved in chronic conflict and improve mutual attitudes. Here we made use of Camus’s (unheeded) call for a civilian truce in Algeria and Randall Forsberg’s nuclear freeze manifesto circulated in the 1980s. (3) A realization that intractable ideological foes don’t have to fight in the name of their incommensurate ideologies. Here we drew on George Kennan’s Long Telegram and subsequent X article. (4) A conviction that waging war in the name of abstract principles or a virtuous political self-understanding may make wars longer and bloodier than they have to be. Here we used Hume’s essay “Of the Balance of Powers.” (5) A belief that truces can be helpful in resting and rearming for a future round of conflict. These five considerations, taken collectively, were labeled “truce thinking.”]

Published: Dec 21, 2015

Keywords: Moral Luck; Khmer Rouge; Peace Agreement; Strong Party; Political Reconciliation

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