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A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Use of Conceptual Analysis in PsychologyIntroduction: Conceptual Analysis and Psychology: An Overview

A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Use of Conceptual Analysis in Psychology: Introduction:... [It has proven surprisingly difficult for psychologists to find unanimous or even unambiguous answers to seemingly simple questions like ‘When do infants and children understand intentions or beliefs?’ or ‘Do primates share intentions with others when they gesture?’ or even ‘Is this phenomenon best explained by conditioning or high-order cognitive processes?’ One reason for this is healthy scientific debate concerning whether a particular gesture or class of gestures truly requires the coordination of intentional behaviour between interlocutors, or whether grounds for belief or other higher-order psychological concepts are satisfied in a particular research theoretical framework. However, another reason, one that we believe to be causing considerable nuisance in contemporary social and behavioural science research, is non-scientific. The root problem is the lack of consideration for the meanings of concepts that are in play in such work and the philosophical positions that are taken, explicitly or otherwise, by the researchers who interpret such psychological terms in particular ways.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

A Wittgensteinian Perspective on the Use of Conceptual Analysis in PsychologyIntroduction: Conceptual Analysis and Psychology: An Overview

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References (1)

Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan UK
Copyright
© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2013
ISBN
978-1-349-35031-5
Pages
1 –9
DOI
10.1057/9781137384287_1
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[It has proven surprisingly difficult for psychologists to find unanimous or even unambiguous answers to seemingly simple questions like ‘When do infants and children understand intentions or beliefs?’ or ‘Do primates share intentions with others when they gesture?’ or even ‘Is this phenomenon best explained by conditioning or high-order cognitive processes?’ One reason for this is healthy scientific debate concerning whether a particular gesture or class of gestures truly requires the coordination of intentional behaviour between interlocutors, or whether grounds for belief or other higher-order psychological concepts are satisfied in a particular research theoretical framework. However, another reason, one that we believe to be causing considerable nuisance in contemporary social and behavioural science research, is non-scientific. The root problem is the lack of consideration for the meanings of concepts that are in play in such work and the philosophical positions that are taken, explicitly or otherwise, by the researchers who interpret such psychological terms in particular ways.]

Published: Nov 5, 2015

Keywords: Conceptual Analysis; Present Volume; Behavioural Science Research; Everyday Sense; Psychological Interest

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