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Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern PhilosophyIdeas as Thick Beliefs: Spinoza on the Normativity of Ideas

Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern Philosophy: Ideas as Thick Beliefs: Spinoza on the... [The question of whether beliefs are normative is often treated with regard to the fact that beliefs can be true or false. If I say something false, I seem to break a rule or deviate from a standard of semantic correctness. Accordingly, the contemporary dispute is about whether there is some sort of social normativity involved here or whether we just happen to deviate from the facts. Against Brandom’s interpretation, this paper argues that already Spinoza offers a fairly thorough account of the (natural) normativity of ideas. In construing ideas as propositional attitudes, I suggest that Spinoza’s ideas are beliefs that respond to two kind of normative constraints. On the one hand, beliefs count as naturally normative in that they are grounded in our striving for self-preservation (conatus). On the other hand, they exhibit a kind of socially rooted normativity in that they are governed by associations reinforced by custom and convention.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern PhilosophyIdeas as Thick Beliefs: Spinoza on the Normativity of Ideas

Part of the Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 29)
Editors: Lenz, Martin; Waldow, Anik

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References (17)

Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordecht. 2013
ISBN
978-94-007-6240-4
Pages
37 –50
DOI
10.1007/978-94-007-6241-1_3
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[The question of whether beliefs are normative is often treated with regard to the fact that beliefs can be true or false. If I say something false, I seem to break a rule or deviate from a standard of semantic correctness. Accordingly, the contemporary dispute is about whether there is some sort of social normativity involved here or whether we just happen to deviate from the facts. Against Brandom’s interpretation, this paper argues that already Spinoza offers a fairly thorough account of the (natural) normativity of ideas. In construing ideas as propositional attitudes, I suggest that Spinoza’s ideas are beliefs that respond to two kind of normative constraints. On the one hand, beliefs count as naturally normative in that they are grounded in our striving for self-preservation (conatus). On the other hand, they exhibit a kind of socially rooted normativity in that they are governed by associations reinforced by custom and convention.]

Published: Mar 11, 2013

Keywords: Propositional Attitude; Content Determination; Natural Normativity; External Body; External Thing

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