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Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern PhilosophyIntentionality Bifurcated: A Lesson from Early Modern Philosophy?

Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern Philosophy: Intentionality Bifurcated: A Lesson from... [This paper examines the pressures leading two very different Early Modern philosophers, Descartes and Locke, to invoke two ways in which thought is directed at objects. According to both philosophers, I argue, the same idea can simultaneously count as “of” two different objects—in two different senses of the phrase ‘idea of’. One kind of intentional directedness is invoked in answering the question What is it to think that thus-and-so? The other kind is invoked in answering the question What accounts for the success of our proper methods of inquiry? For Descartes as well as Locke, the two kinds of “ofness” come apart as a result of strong rationalist commitments. However, I will suggest that even if we reject such commitments, we go wrong if we assume that a single kind of intentional directedness suffices to address both questions.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern PhilosophyIntentionality Bifurcated: A Lesson from Early Modern Philosophy?

Part of the Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 29)
Editors: Lenz, Martin; Waldow, Anik
Shapiro, Lionel
Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern Philosophy — Mar 11, 2013
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References (54)

Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordecht. 2013
ISBN
978-94-007-6240-4
Pages
13 –35
DOI
10.1007/978-94-007-6241-1_2
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[This paper examines the pressures leading two very different Early Modern philosophers, Descartes and Locke, to invoke two ways in which thought is directed at objects. According to both philosophers, I argue, the same idea can simultaneously count as “of” two different objects—in two different senses of the phrase ‘idea of’. One kind of intentional directedness is invoked in answering the question What is it to think that thus-and-so? The other kind is invoked in answering the question What accounts for the success of our proper methods of inquiry? For Descartes as well as Locke, the two kinds of “ofness” come apart as a result of strong rationalist commitments. However, I will suggest that even if we reject such commitments, we go wrong if we assume that a single kind of intentional directedness suffices to address both questions.]

Published: Mar 11, 2013

Keywords: Natural Kind; Complex Idea; Rational Reflection; Distinct Idea; Real Essence

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