Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
H. Vaihinger, R. Schmidt
Kommentar zu Kants Kritik der reinen Vernunft
Leslie Stevenson, Wilfrid Sellars (1970)
Science and Metaphysics: Variations on Kantian Themes.The Philosophical Quarterly, 20
Wilfrid Sellars (1968)
Science And Metaphysics
R. Day (1968)
Studies in perceptionAustralian Psychologist, 2
H. Allison (1988)
Kant's transcendental idealism
G. Bird, R. Wolff (1969)
Kant’s Theory of Mental Activity: A Commentary on the Transcendental Analytic of the Critique of Pure Reason
Jay Rosenberg (2007)
Wilfrid Sellars: Fusing the Images
R. Walker (1977)
Identität und ObjektivitätGrazer Philosophische Studien, 4
Wilfrid Sellars (1982)
Sensa or sensings: Reflections on the ontology of perceptionPhilosophical Studies, 41
Wilfrid Sellars (1963)
Science, perception, and reality
J. Mcdowell (2006)
Sensory Consciousness in Kant and SellarsPhilosophical Topics, 34
Jay Rosenberg (2000)
Perception vs. Inner Sense: A Problem about Direct AwarenessPhilosophical Studies, 101
R. Walker (1977)
Dieter HENRICH: Identität und Objektivität. Eine Untersuchung über Kants transzendentale Deduktion , Carl Winter Universitätsverlag, Heidelberg 1976 (Sitzungsberichte der Heidelberger Akademie der Wissenschaften, Philos.-hist. Klasse 1976, 1. Abhandlung), 112 Seiten.Grazer Philosophische Studien, 4
[Kant famously defends an approach to knowledge involving two ‘stems’ that necessarily interact to generate knowledge of the external world. This comprises, on the one hand, the receptivity of our sensibility, responsible for intuitive representations, and, on the other hand, the spontaneity of our understanding, conceived as a faculty of conceptual representation. It seems that the differentiation between these two ‘stems’ aligns quite neatly with the distinction between natural and normative influences on our knowledge respectively. Conceived this way, one of the persisting questions of Kant scholarship is how nature and the normative can interact in such a way as to produce empirical representations that are shaped by our conceptual constraints. To explain how this is possible, Kant introduces the faculty of imagination, which, guided by the understanding, allows subjects of experience to “synthesize” the representational input of sensibility into conceptually shaped representations. Kant’s philosophy thus offers a complex account of the imagination as the capacity responsible for synthesizing the sensory and conceptual aspects of representation, thereby acting as an intermediary between nature and normativity.]
Published: Mar 11, 2013
Keywords: Receptive Sensation; Intuitive Representation; Productive Imagination; Empirical Concept; Sensory Consciousness
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.