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[Hilary Kornblith’s naturalised epistemology centrally involves the thesis that knowledge is a natural kind like water or aluminium. In his most recent work, Kornblith seeks to defend this thesis by attacking what he perceives to be the central alternative: Edward Craig’s “genealogy of knowledge”. As Kornblith sees it, Craig is committed to the view that knowledge is an artificial or social kind. I argue, against Kornblith, (1) that Kornblith’s favoured account of natural kinds —the account developed by Richard Boyd—does not allow for a distinction between natural and social kinds: monarchy, liberalism, and even Napoleon are all natural kinds for Boyd; (2) that Kornblith misunderstands Craig’s genealogy: Craig is not committed to the view that knowledge is not a natural kind; Craig’s account of how the concept of knowledge has developed is compatible with the idea that we often use “knowledge” as a natural kind term; and (3) that Craig’s genealogy is in fact congenial to the general programme of naturalised epistemology.]
Published: Mar 11, 2013
Keywords: True Belief; Natural Kind; Epistemic State; Natural Kind Term; Naturalize Epistemology
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