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Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern PhilosophyNaturalized Epistemology and the Genealogy of Knowledge

Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern Philosophy: Naturalized Epistemology and the Genealogy... [Hilary Kornblith’s naturalised epistemology centrally involves the thesis that knowledge is a natural kind like water or aluminium. In his most recent work, Kornblith seeks to defend this thesis by attacking what he perceives to be the central alternative: Edward Craig’s “genealogy of knowledge”. As Kornblith sees it, Craig is committed to the view that knowledge is an artificial or social kind. I argue, against Kornblith, (1) that Kornblith’s favoured account of natural kinds —the account developed by Richard Boyd—does not allow for a distinction between natural and social kinds: monarchy, liberalism, and even Napoleon are all natural kinds for Boyd; (2) that Kornblith misunderstands Craig’s genealogy: Craig is not committed to the view that knowledge is not a natural kind; Craig’s account of how the concept of knowledge has developed is compatible with the idea that we often use “knowledge” as a natural kind term; and (3) that Craig’s genealogy is in fact congenial to the general programme of naturalised epistemology.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Contemporary Perspectives on Early Modern PhilosophyNaturalized Epistemology and the Genealogy of Knowledge

Part of the Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 29)
Editors: Lenz, Martin; Waldow, Anik

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References (27)

Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordecht. 2013
ISBN
978-94-007-6240-4
Pages
87 –97
DOI
10.1007/978-94-007-6241-1_6
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[Hilary Kornblith’s naturalised epistemology centrally involves the thesis that knowledge is a natural kind like water or aluminium. In his most recent work, Kornblith seeks to defend this thesis by attacking what he perceives to be the central alternative: Edward Craig’s “genealogy of knowledge”. As Kornblith sees it, Craig is committed to the view that knowledge is an artificial or social kind. I argue, against Kornblith, (1) that Kornblith’s favoured account of natural kinds —the account developed by Richard Boyd—does not allow for a distinction between natural and social kinds: monarchy, liberalism, and even Napoleon are all natural kinds for Boyd; (2) that Kornblith misunderstands Craig’s genealogy: Craig is not committed to the view that knowledge is not a natural kind; Craig’s account of how the concept of knowledge has developed is compatible with the idea that we often use “knowledge” as a natural kind term; and (3) that Craig’s genealogy is in fact congenial to the general programme of naturalised epistemology.]

Published: Mar 11, 2013

Keywords: True Belief; Natural Kind; Epistemic State; Natural Kind Term; Naturalize Epistemology

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