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Counterfactuals and Scientific RealismIntroduction

Counterfactuals and Scientific Realism: Introduction [In an important sense this book is a book about truth. It is about truth in the sciences. More specifically it is about truth and scientific explanation. We can begin to see that there are problems about truth in the sciences when we recognize that ‘truth’ is truth in a model, or truth in an interpretation. This is the substance of the model-theoretic account of truth. But if we accept the model-theoretic account of truth, then it seems that the truth-values of certain claims in the physical sciences can only be ascertained if we are provided with a specification of what model(s) those claims are intended to hold in.1 Clearly we are interested in determining whether the world in which such claims hold is our own, or at least that these claims hold in some world similar to our own. Unfortunately, such models are not always explicitly specified in standard presentations of scientific theories, but we can often discover the features of such models through context. So we can often discover which models those claims are intended to be true in by examining how, and in what context, those claims are intended to be used. Furthermore, insofar as possible worlds are the philosophical or metaphysical analogues of formal models, ascertaining the truth-values of theoretical claims in the physical sciences amounts to discovering which possible worlds those claims are intended to hold in. Perhaps more controversially, one of the main claims defended throughout this book is that it is almost never the case that such theoretical claims are intended to be strictly true of the real world. More often than not theoretical claims in the physical sciences are intended to hold only in more or less highly idealized models, and so are intended to hold only in more or less idealized possible worlds.2 So, one main contention of this book is that if we are to understand theoretical claims at all we must be able to make sense of more or less highly idealized possible worlds. The proposal adopted here is to identify idealized possible worlds with incomplete worlds, and incomplete worlds with partial models. Worlds are then characterized as intensional relational structures, and this is because that is the most efficacious way to deal with the relevant sense of the partiality of worlds.3 In most of the book discussion of the metaphysical status of these simpler worlds will be ignored, but in Chapter 4 we shall see that a wide range of ontological views of possible worlds are compatible with the main results of the book.4 This will effectively allow for the tabling of the metaphysical issues involved, particularly as they are not the primary concern of this book.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Counterfactuals and Scientific RealismIntroduction

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Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan UK
Copyright
© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2012
ISBN
978-1-349-33906-8
Pages
1 –10
DOI
10.1057/9781137271587_1
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[In an important sense this book is a book about truth. It is about truth in the sciences. More specifically it is about truth and scientific explanation. We can begin to see that there are problems about truth in the sciences when we recognize that ‘truth’ is truth in a model, or truth in an interpretation. This is the substance of the model-theoretic account of truth. But if we accept the model-theoretic account of truth, then it seems that the truth-values of certain claims in the physical sciences can only be ascertained if we are provided with a specification of what model(s) those claims are intended to hold in.1 Clearly we are interested in determining whether the world in which such claims hold is our own, or at least that these claims hold in some world similar to our own. Unfortunately, such models are not always explicitly specified in standard presentations of scientific theories, but we can often discover the features of such models through context. So we can often discover which models those claims are intended to be true in by examining how, and in what context, those claims are intended to be used. Furthermore, insofar as possible worlds are the philosophical or metaphysical analogues of formal models, ascertaining the truth-values of theoretical claims in the physical sciences amounts to discovering which possible worlds those claims are intended to hold in. Perhaps more controversially, one of the main claims defended throughout this book is that it is almost never the case that such theoretical claims are intended to be strictly true of the real world. More often than not theoretical claims in the physical sciences are intended to hold only in more or less highly idealized models, and so are intended to hold only in more or less idealized possible worlds.2 So, one main contention of this book is that if we are to understand theoretical claims at all we must be able to make sense of more or less highly idealized possible worlds. The proposal adopted here is to identify idealized possible worlds with incomplete worlds, and incomplete worlds with partial models. Worlds are then characterized as intensional relational structures, and this is because that is the most efficacious way to deal with the relevant sense of the partiality of worlds.3 In most of the book discussion of the metaphysical status of these simpler worlds will be ignored, but in Chapter 4 we shall see that a wide range of ontological views of possible worlds are compatible with the main results of the book.4 This will effectively allow for the tabling of the metaphysical issues involved, particularly as they are not the primary concern of this book.]

Published: Oct 26, 2015

Keywords: Physical Science; Small World; Idealize World; Default Logic; Theoretical Claim

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