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Democracy at LargeNigeria, “Democrazy,” and the German Political Foundations

Democracy at Large: Nigeria, “Democrazy,” and the German Political Foundations [Most studies on the transfer of public policies to developing countries focus on the acceptance, the assimilation, or the refusal of norms. As a result, researchers usually analyze the factors of “cultural” resistance or “political” opposition to Western models of good governance (Brownlee, 2007; Bayart, 1996; Carothers, 2004.). But they often tend to insist on the importers’ failures rather than the exporters’ views to explain the rejection of the “democratic transplant.”1 So there is definitely a need to bridge academic gaps between three main categories of actors: the local ruling class, middlemen, and “translators,” and the international organizations that aim to promote political norms on a global scale. Africa’s most populated state, Nigeria, is an interesting case study in this regard, because it is both a typical example of bad governance and a testing ground for “democracy brokers.”2 Renowned for its corruption, its violence, and its “oil curse,” it has been monitored quite closely by the international community since the end of military rule and the return of civilian power in 1999. Compared to other countries in Africa, however, it seems to be less inf luenced by democracy brokers. A demographic and economic giant, Nigeria depends very little on international aid. Moreover, its ruling class is quite suspicious of foreign and humanitarian agencies that violated its national sovereignty during the Biafra War. A true regional power, Nigeria has also the capacity to reject Western models of governance despite poor management and the poverty of its population.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Democracy at LargeNigeria, “Democrazy,” and the German Political Foundations

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References (16)

Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan US
Copyright
© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Nature America Inc. 2012
ISBN
978-1-349-44124-2
Pages
231 –246
DOI
10.1057/9781137032768_11
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[Most studies on the transfer of public policies to developing countries focus on the acceptance, the assimilation, or the refusal of norms. As a result, researchers usually analyze the factors of “cultural” resistance or “political” opposition to Western models of good governance (Brownlee, 2007; Bayart, 1996; Carothers, 2004.). But they often tend to insist on the importers’ failures rather than the exporters’ views to explain the rejection of the “democratic transplant.”1 So there is definitely a need to bridge academic gaps between three main categories of actors: the local ruling class, middlemen, and “translators,” and the international organizations that aim to promote political norms on a global scale. Africa’s most populated state, Nigeria, is an interesting case study in this regard, because it is both a typical example of bad governance and a testing ground for “democracy brokers.”2 Renowned for its corruption, its violence, and its “oil curse,” it has been monitored quite closely by the international community since the end of military rule and the return of civilian power in 1999. Compared to other countries in Africa, however, it seems to be less inf luenced by democracy brokers. A demographic and economic giant, Nigeria depends very little on international aid. Moreover, its ruling class is quite suspicious of foreign and humanitarian agencies that violated its national sovereignty during the Biafra War. A true regional power, Nigeria has also the capacity to reject Western models of governance despite poor management and the poverty of its population.]

Published: Nov 11, 2015

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