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Descartes-AgonistesMethod and the Problem of the Historical Descartes

Descartes-Agonistes: Method and the Problem of the Historical Descartes [This chapter pauses our narrative, for a necessary conceptual and historiographical interlude: It addresses the problem of how exactly to handle the young Descartes’ belief in his own method. Modern scholarship in history, philosophy and sociology of science—from Bachelard and Koyré, through to Kuhn and Feyerabend—debunks the idea that there is, or can be, a universal, efficacious and transferable ‘scientific method’. But, we still need a way of dealing with historical actors’ belief in their own method claims, and their tendency to define their intellectual agendas in these terms. We cannot believe in Descartes’ method, but neither can we merely debunk his own belief in it. We need to understand how methodological doctrines create for believers their appearances of unity, efficacy, applicability and progress, whilst remaining, for the very same reasons, structurally incapable of delivering what they promise. Building on the conceptual basis set down in Chap. 2, this Chapter offers a model of methodological discourse for these purposes, allowing us to deal more appropriately in subsequent chapters with the Descartes’ apparently genuine belief in his own method.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Descartes-AgonistesMethod and the Problem of the Historical Descartes

Part of the Studies in History and Philosophy of Science Book Series (volume 27)
Schuster, John
Descartes-Agonistes — Aug 14, 2012
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References (47)

Publisher
Springer Netherlands
Copyright
© Springer Science+Business Media Dordrecht. 2013
ISBN
978-94-007-4745-6
Pages
265 –305
DOI
10.1007/978-94-007-4746-3_6
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[This chapter pauses our narrative, for a necessary conceptual and historiographical interlude: It addresses the problem of how exactly to handle the young Descartes’ belief in his own method. Modern scholarship in history, philosophy and sociology of science—from Bachelard and Koyré, through to Kuhn and Feyerabend—debunks the idea that there is, or can be, a universal, efficacious and transferable ‘scientific method’. But, we still need a way of dealing with historical actors’ belief in their own method claims, and their tendency to define their intellectual agendas in these terms. We cannot believe in Descartes’ method, but neither can we merely debunk his own belief in it. We need to understand how methodological doctrines create for believers their appearances of unity, efficacy, applicability and progress, whilst remaining, for the very same reasons, structurally incapable of delivering what they promise. Building on the conceptual basis set down in Chap. 2, this Chapter offers a model of methodological discourse for these purposes, allowing us to deal more appropriately in subsequent chapters with the Descartes’ apparently genuine belief in his own method.]

Published: Aug 14, 2012

Keywords: Knowledge Claim; Heuristic Rule; Scientific Revolution; Literary Effect; Target Field

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