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J. Austin, G. Warnock (1963)
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R. Schwartz (2012)
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L. Downing (2005)
Berkeley's natural philosophy and philosophy of science
Kenneth Pearce (2013)
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K. Winkler (2005)
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D. Jesseph (1993)
Berkeley's Philosophy of Mathematics
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Particles and ideas
Michael Liston (2017)
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D. Davidson (2001)
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K. Popper (1953)
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Marc Hight (2010)
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L. Friedman (1997)
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William Demopoulos, B. Fraassen (1980)
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A. Eddington
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Robert Schwartz (2017)
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Kenneth Pearce (2017)
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L. Downing (1995)
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K. Winkler (1989)
Berkeley: An Interpretation
[The author argues that much of the debate over the status of instrumentalism in Berkeley’s philosophy can be clarified if one sees him as Pragmatic instrumentalist. Pragmatic instrumentalism is a constructivist account of inquiry, quite similar the views of the classic American Pragmatists on the nature of scientific concepts, language, and truth. We forge concepts in our efforts to order and organize experience in ways that meet the continually changing evidence and intellectual needs. Hence, the content of our concepts evolve hand in hand with the theories in which they are embedded. Pragmatic instrumentalism is to be distinguished from the more standard anti-Realist instrumentalist position that challenges the status of theoretical terms and the positing of unobservable entities. From a Pragmatic instrumentalist perspective, it is not inconsistent for Berkeley to be willing to accept some claims about the existence of theoretical entities and deny others. For some run afoul of the Pragmatic Maxim, and others do not. This essay explores the implications of Berkeley’s pragmatic stance with regard to a number of controversial ontological claims about force, corpuscles, the ether, light, and space. The issues were the focus of attention not only in his time but continued to be matters of concern in the years that followed. In particular, his instrumentalist convictions play a major role in his argument against Newton’s absolute space in favor of a relativist space. According to Berkeley the empirical consequences of the former are no different from those of the latter. Thus, according to the Pragmatic Maxim, they are cognitively the same. Berkeley argues that a relative conception of space can handle all the empirical findings of an absolute conception. Moreover, the notion of relative space does not run into a number of conceptual problems that the idea of absolute space must confront.]
Published: Nov 4, 2020
Keywords: Pragmatism; Instrumentalism; Space
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