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[The theoretical starting point of the empirical study into the conceptions of ordinary arguers about the reasonableness or unreasonableness of fallacies reported on in this volume is the pragma-dialectical argumentation theory. Characteristic of this theory is that the fallacies are not, as is generally the case in approaches to fallacies based on logic, conceived as reasonings that are invalid from a formal perspective, but as moves in a discussion that are unreasonable from a dialectical perspective because they hinder, frustrate or even block the resolution of a difference of opinion on the merits: fallacies are then violations of rules for critical discussion.]
Published: Jan 1, 2009
Keywords: Proof Rule; Discussion Context; Reasonable Argumentation; Circumstantial Variant; Discussion Move
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