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Family Values and Value CreationFamily Firms and the Contingent Value of Board Interlocks: The Spanish Case

Family Values and Value Creation: Family Firms and the Contingent Value of Board Interlocks: The... [In the last three decades, interlocking directorates have become a prominent area of research in the Corporate Governance literature. An interlocking directorate is created when a person affiliated with the board of directors of one organization sits on the board of another organization (Mizruchi, 1996). Over the years, researchers have studied the embeddedness of commercial banks, insurance companies and industrial corporations in the interlocking directorates (e.g., Davis and Mizruchi, 1999; Davis, Yoo and Baker, 2003; Mintz and Schwartz, 1981; Windolf, 1998). Furthermore, scholars have sought to provide direct evidence of the value that interlocking directorates have for corporations. Previous studies showed that interlocking directors affect organizational learning (see, e.g., Haunschild, 1993, 1994), the corporations’ power and status (e.g., Davis and Robbins, 2004). Resource dependence theory argues that firms use board ties to manage their resource interdependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), for instance, when banks directors sit on the boards of the companies to which they have lent financial resources (Davis and Mizruchi, 1999; Mizruchi, 1996). However, most studies on interlocking directorates have studied primarily US-based public companies and neglected the role of family firms in these networks.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Family Values and Value CreationFamily Firms and the Contingent Value of Board Interlocks: The Spanish Case

Part of the A Family Business Publication Book Series
Editors: Tàpies, Josep; Ward, John L.

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References (44)

Publisher
Palgrave Macmillan UK
Copyright
© Palgrave Macmillan, a division of Macmillan Publishers Limited 2008
ISBN
978-1-349-30332-8
Pages
236 –259
DOI
10.1057/9780230594227_12
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[In the last three decades, interlocking directorates have become a prominent area of research in the Corporate Governance literature. An interlocking directorate is created when a person affiliated with the board of directors of one organization sits on the board of another organization (Mizruchi, 1996). Over the years, researchers have studied the embeddedness of commercial banks, insurance companies and industrial corporations in the interlocking directorates (e.g., Davis and Mizruchi, 1999; Davis, Yoo and Baker, 2003; Mintz and Schwartz, 1981; Windolf, 1998). Furthermore, scholars have sought to provide direct evidence of the value that interlocking directorates have for corporations. Previous studies showed that interlocking directors affect organizational learning (see, e.g., Haunschild, 1993, 1994), the corporations’ power and status (e.g., Davis and Robbins, 2004). Resource dependence theory argues that firms use board ties to manage their resource interdependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978), for instance, when banks directors sit on the boards of the companies to which they have lent financial resources (Davis and Mizruchi, 1999; Mizruchi, 1996). However, most studies on interlocking directorates have studied primarily US-based public companies and neglected the role of family firms in these networks.]

Published: Oct 21, 2015

Keywords: Corporate Governance; Family Firm; Family Business; Betweenness Centrality; Eigenvector Centrality

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