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Financing in EuropeWhen Things Go Wrong: Credit, Defaults and Institutions in Early Modern Venice

Financing in Europe: When Things Go Wrong: Credit, Defaults and Institutions in Early Modern Venice [Cecchini analyses how merchants and political institutions cope with failures and defaults that compromise credit relationships in an early modern trading centre. Focusing on the structure of financing business and trade in Venice and on the legal framework that protects creditors, she links the widespread form of trading company (the temporary partnership) to the large recourse to arbitration procedures for solving disputes, and to the lesser efficiency of institutional and legal frameworks traditionally securing credit rights in Venice. ‘Credit, Defaults and Institutions in Early Modern Venice’ concludes with the hypothesis that the changing commercial environment and the spread of temporary societies reduce the protective strength of Venetian institutions and increase instability in financing international trade.] http://www.deepdyve.com/assets/images/DeepDyve-Logo-lg.png

Financing in EuropeWhen Things Go Wrong: Credit, Defaults and Institutions in Early Modern Venice

Editors: Lorenzini, Marcella; Lorandini, Cinzia; Coffman, D'Maris
Financing in Europe — Feb 20, 2018

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References (22)

Publisher
Springer International Publishing
Copyright
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018
ISBN
978-3-319-58492-8
Pages
47 –74
DOI
10.1007/978-3-319-58493-5_3
Publisher site
See Chapter on Publisher Site

Abstract

[Cecchini analyses how merchants and political institutions cope with failures and defaults that compromise credit relationships in an early modern trading centre. Focusing on the structure of financing business and trade in Venice and on the legal framework that protects creditors, she links the widespread form of trading company (the temporary partnership) to the large recourse to arbitration procedures for solving disputes, and to the lesser efficiency of institutional and legal frameworks traditionally securing credit rights in Venice. ‘Credit, Defaults and Institutions in Early Modern Venice’ concludes with the hypothesis that the changing commercial environment and the spread of temporary societies reduce the protective strength of Venetian institutions and increase instability in financing international trade.]

Published: Feb 20, 2018

Keywords: Early Modern Venice; Temporary Partnership; Creditor Rights; Rialto; Limited Partnership

There are no references for this article.