Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
K. Gardikas (2018)
American Foreign Policy towards the Colonels’ Greece: Uncertain Allies and the 1967 Coup d’État by Neovi M. Karakatsanis and Jonathan Swarts (review)Mediterranean Quarterly, 29
Konstantina Maragkou (2014)
The Relevance of Détente to American Foreign Policy: The Case of Greece, 1967–1979Diplomacy & Statecraft, 25
C. Sulzberger (1970)
Greece under the ColonelsForeign Affairs, 48
Sotiris Rizas (2013)
Domestic and External Factors in Greece’s Relations with the Soviet Union: Early Cold War to DétenteMediterranean Quarterly, 24
Konstantina Maragkou (2006)
The Foreign Factor and the Greek Colonels’ Coming to Power on 21 April 1967Southeast European and Black Sea Studies, 6
Leonidas Kallivretakis (2014)
Greek–American relations in the Yom Kippur War concurrenceHistorical Review-la Revue Historique, 11
E. Pedaliu (2017)
The US, the Balkans and Détente, 1963–73
H. Wentker (2007)
Außenpolitik in engen Grenzen : die DDR im internationalen System, 1949-1989
Vaios Kalogrias (2018)
Heinz A. Richter, Griechenland 1945–1946. Die britische Intervention. (Peleus. Studien zur Archäologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns, Bd. 69.) Mainz/Ruhpolding/Wiesbaden, Franz Philip Rutzen/Harrassowitz 2016Historische Zeitschrift, 306
T. Kostadinova (2014)
60 Years of Diplomatic Relations between Greece and Bulgaria: Challenges and Benefits of the Reconciliation ProcessComparative Southeast European Studies, 62
[The Greek military regime’s policy towards Communist countries from 1969 until 1973 was a constellation of political, economic and geopolitical factors. The Colonels’ non-political relationship with the “hateful communists” was based on reasons related to domestic propaganda and the regime’s attempt to create the impression of an independent foreign policy. Despite the downside of the legitimisation of a staunch anti-Communist dictatorial regime, Eastern European countries embraced Greece’s opening, with a view to end their marginalisation following the Prague Spring. In fact, it served very effectively propaganda purposes for both sides. The Greek military regime could boast of its independent foreign policy outside the country and unsettle the leftist opposition inside. The Soviet Bloc demonstrated its technological and economic achievements and entertained the international outcry against the Warsaw Pact invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968. In the Soviet propagandist discourse, the Western capitalist states flattered them, to try to establish ties with Communist states despite their ideological aversion, in order to gain benefits. Moral indignation was not allowed to affect the self-interest of the countries involved. In retrospect, it can be easily concluded that it provoked much more perplexity and concern than it really deserved. Undoubtedly, it was marked by some spectacular events, such as the diplomatic normalisation of relations with some countries to which the Greek state had had only limited ties or no ties at all, the clinching of trade deals, as well as the exchange of official visits at the highest level. However, it brought limited tangible results in economic terms (the trade volume declined compared to the previous period) and, contrary to fears in the Western camp amid serious political unrest in the Middle East, North Africa and Europe threatening to disrupt the power equilibrium in the wider region, did not affect Greece’s position in the NATO Alliance at all.]
Published: Feb 1, 2021
Read and print from thousands of top scholarly journals.
Already have an account? Log in
Bookmark this article. You can see your Bookmarks on your DeepDyve Library.
To save an article, log in first, or sign up for a DeepDyve account if you don’t already have one.
Copy and paste the desired citation format or use the link below to download a file formatted for EndNote
Access the full text.
Sign up today, get DeepDyve free for 14 days.
All DeepDyve websites use cookies to improve your online experience. They were placed on your computer when you launched this website. You can change your cookie settings through your browser.